• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
Democracy
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "Andrei Kolesnikov"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "",
  "programs": [],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "Russia",
    "Caucasus"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Political Reform",
    "Democracy",
    "Economy",
    "Foreign Policy"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

Why Sanctions on Russia Don’t Work

The Western approach to Russia is predicated on the supposition that continued pressure on the country will cause Vladimir Putin’s regime to make concessions or even crumble. However, this is far from the truth.

Link Copied
By Andrei Kolesnikov
Published on Mar 28, 2015

Source: Project Syndicate

The Western approach to Russia is predicated on the supposition that continued pressure on the country will cause President Vladimir Putin’s regime to make concessions or even crumble. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The assumption underlying the efficacy of Western sanctions is that the sharp economic deterioration that results from them will turn the Russian public, particularly the financial and political elite, against the Kremlin. Putin will not be able to withstand mounting dissent from affluent urban areas and the country’s burgeoning middle class.

Meanwhile, the thinking goes, military pressure – in the form of potential lethal aid to Ukraine – will similarly mobilize ordinary Russians against Putin. Unwilling to see their boys die for the Donbas, they will form an anti-war movement that will force him to rein in his territorial ambitions. Pressed at once from above and from below, the Kremlin will be have to change its policies, and perhaps even begin to democratize.

What Western policymakers fail to understand is that such an approach is less likely to undermine the regime than to cause Russians to close ranks behind it. Opinion polls show that Russians perceive Western pressure and sanctions to be aimed not at Putin and his cronies, but at Russia and its citizens. In January, 69% of Russians supported the Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, according to a poll by the independent Levada Center.

To be sure, Putin’s support is not rock-solid; indeed, there is widespread suspicion about corruption in his government. But Russians have a long tradition of defending their compatriots from outsiders. And in this case, the compatriots under attack are Putin and his government.

Russian propaganda taps a deep well of nationalism, artfully playing off sentiments and imagery from World War II. Known in the country as the Great Patriotic War, the effort to defend the country from German invasion remains sacred to many Russians. That is why the Kremlin has repackaged derogatory historical terms like “Nazis” to refer to Ukraine’s current political elites.

Russian society has been militarized for decades, if not centuries. Military preparedness was one of the most important shared values in the Soviet Union – a sentiment captured in the slogan emblazoned on the badges issued to children who excelled in athletics: “Ready for Work and Defense.”

It is in this context that Putin has been able to use Western pressure as a tool to regain the support of many Russians, who only a few years ago would have felt detached from, if not alienated by, his government. Presented with a real or imagined threat to the fatherland, the average Russian supports the country’s leaders.

Nor is the Russian middle class, which makes up some 20-30% of the population, likely to pose much of a threat to Putin. With many of its members owing their recent wealth to high oil prices and the economic recovery of the 2000s, loyalty to the Putin regime is one of the Russian middle class’s abiding characteristics.

Russian opinion polling and sociological research tends to show that the higher one’s position in society, the more likely one is to vote for the incumbents. The motives behind such voting patterns may vary – some voters made a fortune during the economic recovery, while others are simply satisfied with the status quo. But the bottom line is that such voters demonstrate a fundamental loyalty to the state and the regime.

Indeed, only a small portion of the middle class attended the protests that gathered force in late 2011 and early 2012, most of them concentrated in Moscow. And, in any case, Putin’s clampdown on dissent was predictably ruthless. He tightened legislation aimed at throttling civil society, pursued lawsuits against protesters, and blocked the activity of Alexei Navalny, a promising opposition politician. These efforts have had a lasting effect on the groups that were at the heart of the protest movement.

Russians of all walks of life have shown that they prefer passive adaptation over protest. In the face of growing economic pressures, Russia’s middle class is steering clear of political involvement. The working class is no different. The more the West increases its pressure, the less likely it becomes that this will change.

This article originally appeared on Project Syndicate.

Andrei Kolesnikov
Former Senior Fellow, Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center
Andrei Kolesnikov
Political ReformDemocracyEconomyForeign PolicyRussiaCaucasus

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Taking the Pulse: Can the EU Attract Foreign Investment and Reduce Dependencies?

    EU member states clash over how to boost the union’s competitiveness: Some want to favor European industries in public procurement, while others worry this could deter foreign investment. So, can the EU simultaneously attract global capital and reduce dependencies?

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz, ed.

  • Article
    What Can the EU Do About Trump 2.0?

    Europe’s policy of subservience to the Trump administration has failed. For Washington to take the EU seriously, its leaders now need to combine engagement with robust pushback.

      Stefan Lehne

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    To Survive, the EU Must Split

    Leaning into a multispeed Europe that includes the UK is the way Europeans don’t get relegated to suffering what they must, while the mighty United States and China do what they want.

      • Rym Momtaz

      Rym Momtaz

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    In Uzbekistan, the President’s Daughter Is Now His Second-in-Command

    Having failed to build a team that he can fully trust or establish strong state institutions, Mirziyoyev has become reliant on his family.

      Galiya Ibragimova

  • Trump stands in front of a blue screen reading "Board of Peace"
    Paper
    U.S. Peace Mediation in the Middle East: Lessons for the Gaza Peace Plan

    As Gaza peace negotiations take center stage, Washington should use the tools that have proven the most effective over the past decades of Middle East mediation.

      • Sarah Yerkes

      Amr Hamzawy, Sarah Yerkes, Kathryn Selfe

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600Fax: 202 483 1840
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.