Over the past few days, massive protests have broken out in reaction to Donald Trump’s executive order officially recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. This decision has deep implications for Palestinian politics, not least the latest attempts by Fatah and Hamas to form a unity government, rising popular unrest, and prospects for a negotiated settlement with Israel.
Six experts examine what Trump’s announcement means for Palestine. Please join the discussion by sharing your thoughts in the comments section below.
Repercussions on the Peace Process
Mahmoud Jaraba
Mahmoud Jaraba, a researcher and lecturer at Erlangen Center for Islam and Law in Europe (EZIRE) and the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Germany. Follow him on Twitter @MahmoudJaraba.
President Donald Trump said that recognizing East and West Jerusalem as the unified capital of Israel and moving the U.S. Embassy there from Tel Aviv would advance the Israeli–Palestinian peace process. Contrary to his stated goal, this step has created a crisis threatening the future of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and instead paved the way for a new cycle of mass unrest.
Since signing the Oslo Accord in 1993, the PA has worked to establish an independent Palestinian state whose capital is East Jerusalem. It is not plausible that Palestinians will accept the U.S. recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and at the same time still accept the U.S. as a fair and impartial broker. Herein lies the current quandary for the Palestinian leadership headed by President Mahmoud Abbas. If it still accepts Washington as a peace broker, it risks losing its own legitimacy with the Palestinian people. But if it refuses to do so, it will antagonize the Trump administration, possibly resulting in an unbearably high cost, such as its own isolation or downfall. In either scenario, the PA comes out as the biggest loser. Trump’s decision did not only “strip the United States of its eligibility as an intermediary in the peace process,” as Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki said, but also could trigger the collapse of the PA and its fragile institutions. In this case, anything is possible for the Palestinian political situation, including the reoccupation of the West Bank by Israel.
Faced with the challenge of the U.S. decision and the fear of losing its popular legitimacy, the PA will try to reconcile these two starkly opposing options. Despite the string of statements by PA officials that they will not meet with U.S. officials—including Vice President Mike Pence, who is scheduled to visit Tel Aviv on December 18—the PA has announced it will continue to search for a peaceful resolution. Yet it is trying to use different tactics that do not rely on U.S mediation. This was clear in Mahmoud Abbas’s speech before the Islamic Summit in Istanbul on December 13, during which he called upon Muslim countries “to move the entire profile of the conflict to the United Nations and the formation of a new mechanism to adopt the implementation of resolutions of international legitimacy, as the U.S. is no longer an honest negotiations mediator.” In other words, Abbas is trying to seek new sponsors for the diplomatic process for peace.
The PA has also turned a blind eye to the mass protests in the West Bank, while preventing them from snowballing into acts of violence. After Trump’s announcement, all of the Palestinian political forces called for public protests. The two main players on the Palestinian scene, Hamas and Fatah, supported this step, but only Hamas called for a new intifada.
In his decision, Trump killed any hope for a peace process. Trump’s announcement said nothing about Palestinian rights, as he did not address the Palestinians as a crucial partner in the peace process. This might indicate that the Trump administration has already started planning for a nascent, ill-defined post-Oslo phase. These actions likely will not include the Palestinians as an actor, but rather involve U.S. coordination with some Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
This article was translated from Arabic.
Another Humiliation for Abbas
Elhanan Miller
Elhanan Miller, freelance journalist and researcher on Palestinian politics at the Forum for Regional Thinking. Follow him on Twitter @ElhananMiller.
President Donald Trump’s speech on December 6, recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and announcing his intention to relocate the U.S. embassy there, weakens Mahmoud Abbas’s policy of “nothing but diplomacy.”
Trump’s speech is the culmination of a larger process that marginalizes and weakens the Palestinian Authority (PA) in the eyes of the Palestinian public. In November, the U.S. State Department threatened to shutter the PLO office in Washington following President Abbas’s call in the UN to prosecute Israeli officials at the International Criminal Court (ICC). The administration retracted the move a few days later, not before warning the office to limit its activities to “those related to achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between the Israelis and Palestinians,” meaning not to pursue Israelis in the ICC.
Congress is now in the final stages of passing the Taylor Force Act, which will dramatically cut funding to the Palestinian Authority if it continues to pay salaries to the families of prisoners convicted for acts of violence against U.S. and Israeli citizens. The bill, named for a young American officer stabbed to death in Jaffa in March 2016, passed in the House of Representatives on December 5, and is expected to pass a vote in the Senate later this month. The abrupt slashing of funds to thousands of families will inevitably lead to widespread protests on the streets of Ramallah, largely directed at the PA and its leadership.
The process by which Fatah has been weakened and discredited plays to the advantage of Hamas. The Palestinian street remembers that in the Galid Shalit prisoner exchange of 2011, Hamas successfully freed 1,027 Palestinians from Israeli jails, while Fatah managed to release just 78 prisoners as part of the peace talks with Israel in 2013-2014. Palestinians also remember that Hamas and other “resistance” organizations in Gaza caused Ariel Sharon, one of Israel’s most hawkish prime ministers, to withdraw from the entire Gaza Strip in 2005 following a concerted series of bombardments and suicide attacks against settlements in the region.
The PLO, for its part, has achieved little since pushing Israel out of the Palestinian cities of the West Bank over 20 years ago. This deals a further blow to the Palestinian peace camp and diminishes the possibility of resumption of peace talks. Serious negotiations for peace will likely have to wait for regime change either in Ramallah, Jerusalem, or Washington.
Popular Anger a Boon for Hamas
Imad Alsoos
Imad Alsoos, a Palestinian researcher on social movements and Islamic movements.
Following the December 6 announcement, Ismail Haniyeh, the head of the Hamas Political Bureau, called for the cancelation of the Oslo Accords and the start of the “Intifada of freedom of Jerusalem.” How Hamas acts on this opening affects its attempts to achieve reconciliation with the Palestinian Authority (PA) and to end the siege of Gaza.
Prime Minister Rami Hamdallah visited Gaza on December 7, classifying his visit as a “response to the U.S. declaration.” He was careful to adopt less hardened positions toward Hamas and renewed the PA’s promises to implement reconciliation and ease the siege on Gaza, indicating Fatah sees an intifada as more costly than reconciliation and compromise with Hamas. Israel shares the PA objective of preventing the outbreak of a popular intifada. Since the start of the protests last week, one Palestinian has been killed at the hands of Israeli soldiers. Compared to the start of the second intifada—which broke against then-opposition leader Ariel Sharon’s intrusion to the al-Aqsa Compound in Jerusalem—the death toll was 12 by the end of the first week. It seems Israel wants to avoid mass funerals, which in the past intifada turned into mass protests that led to more causalities. Instead, Israel would prefer a military confrontation with Hamas. Despite the Israeli air strike against Hamas targets that killed two Palestinians in Gaza on December 12, Hamas is determined to keep its approach focused on popular protests and avoid any militarization, recalling the failure of this approach in the second intifada.
On the same day of Hamdallah’s visit, Haniyeh announced that he had given “instructions to all Hamas activists to be steady and ready in all places, in the inside [Palestine] or the outside, to prepare themselves for the next stage.” Hamas’s ability to translate these moves into a “renewed” intifada, as Haniyeh described it, will impose popular pressure on the PA to achieve reconciliation without Hamas having to make strategic concessions such as its preferential status in Gaza. This will necessarily strengthen the position and role of Hamas in the Palestinian political arena and restore its popular support, recalling the movement’s position and popularity on the eve of the 2006 Palestinian general elections.
Although Hamas’s resources are too limited to start a popular intifada on its own, its internal structure is more than capable of leading and maintaining the momentum of a popular intifada. Already, Hamas has shown it can tap into popular resistance as shown by the December 8 “day of rage,” seeing Friday protests as an opportunity to regain its political role. Popular protests could end the public’s demobilization that has limited Hamas’s ability to launch a popular uprising in recent years. This could empower Hamas not only with regard to the reconciliation with Fatah but also to heavily reconfigure Palestinian leadership as a whole.
Encouraging the Knesset’s Right Wing
Ofer Zalzberg
Ofer Zalzberg, the Senior Analyst for Israel and Palestine at the International Crisis Group. Follow him on Twitter @OferZalzberg.
The Israeli government’s reaction has been one of muted celebration, respecting President Trump’s request not to further enflame Palestinian and Arab sentiments. The recognition won praise from Israel’s entire governing coalition and from parts of the opposition. For Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Trump’s declaration is an achievement that distracts from his political troubles. Isaac Herzog, the opposition’s chairperson in the Knesset, called it “historic justice.” Rabbis spoke of the U.S. president as an agent of divine will, and Zionist thinkers depicted him as a latter-day Lord Balfour.
Those who support annexation of the West Bank now have a tailwind. Their initiatives have been put on hold until Palestinian protests subside, but they soon will resurface. Right-wing Knesset members who long have planned to advance construction between Jerusalem and the neighboring settlement of Maale Adumim—in order to make the contiguity of a future Palestinian state impossible and expand the city’s municipal boundaries—hope the White House will not stand in their way, as previous U.S. administrations have.
Annexationism also has been boosted because, at least for the time being, alarmist predictions regarding Trump’s announcement have not materialized. Assuming they do not, right-wing leaders will continue to raise doubts about other worst-case scenarios presented by their political foes. Some are now daring to ask if Israel could annex some or all of what it calls Judea and Samaria without a third intifada, or if it could get away with erecting a synagogue on the Temple Mount (al-Haram al-Sharif). Israeli assessments of the consequences of Trump’s proclamation likely will have a significant impact on potential Israeli annexationist moves.
Jerusalem recognition aggravated the diplomatic impasse. The PLO now rejects U.S.-mediated negotiations and Israel will not accept another mediator. It suits Netanyahu just fine for White House to see the Palestinian side as the rejectionists. A prolonged diplomatic breakdown will, however, pose a problem for Netanyahu’s plans for rapprochement with the Gulf countries, whose leaders were embarrassed by Trump’s move, at least publicly.
The U.S. proclamation also pours more fuel into already combustible arenas. The first is the Gaza Strip, where against the backdrop of a dire humanitarian crisis, Islamic Jihad and rogue Salafi-jihadi groups are again trading fire with Israel after a long period of quiet. The second is Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade (Temple Mount/al-Haram al-Sharif), where Temple activist groups increasingly are building cooperative relationships with Israeli police. President Trump did well to affirm the status quo at the holy sites as part of his recognition, but his caution will be for naught should the Israeli police facilitate these activists’ agenda.
There are ample reasons to be doubtful about what the Trump administration’s peace efforts will achieve. He may have earned himself goodwill in Israel, but at the cost of inflating annexationist sentiment and stirring trouble at Jerusalem’s Holy Esplanade.
Changing the Demographics of Jerusalem
Betty Herschman
Betty Herschman, director of international relations and advocacy at Ir Amim, Israel’s longest standing NGO focused on Jerusalem within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
Last week, the president of the United States fulfilled his campaign promise to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, solidifying that promise by unilaterally recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Meanwhile, the 300,000 Palestinian permanent residents of the city—citizens of no nation—will continue to live under an increasingly violent state of occupation. Their collective national aspiration to locate the capital of their future state in East Jerusalem has been patently invalidated by Trump’s unilateral declaration while the Israeli right-wing establishment has been further emboldened to expedite their own unilateral plans.
No sooner had Trump done his damage than promoters of a bill to amend the Basic Law on Jerusalem: Capital of Israel had pushed it forward for final readings in the Knesset. The amendment is one of several bills and plans transparently designed to unilaterally and decisively redraw the borders of the city and manipulate the city’s demographic balance back to the 70:30 ratio that has driven Israeli policymaking in Jerusalem since 1967. Together, they represent the first practical move since the annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967 to implement the de facto annexation of areas in the West Bank to Israel, while at the same time conducting a massive transfer of Palestinians—permanent residents of the city—from Jerusalem.
Trump took pains to clarify that the United States would take no formal position on borders or other final status issues. In fact, by making his statement at a moment when even center-left legislators are introducing plans to separate the Palestinian neighborhoods annexed in 1967—now an integral part of the urban fabric of the city—he has had a pronounced impact on efforts to accomplish that very goal.
At risk are 120,000 Palestinians living within the boundaries of the city but left on the other side of the Separation Barrier. For more than a decade, rampant poverty and municipal neglect have driven them out of the core of East Jerusalem while a mushrooming stock of unregulated but relatively more affordable housing has lured them to even more forsaken neighborhoods. Israel has effectively managed the silent transfer of Palestinians to the neighborhoods beyond the barrier. Now, key lawmakers such as Minister of Jerusalem Affairs Ze’ev Elkin (Likud) and Minister of Education Naftali Bennett (Jewish Home) propose to put them under their own “regional authority” outside the municipality of Jerusalem in a last step toward severing these neighborhoods altogether.
The Israeli government could not have done better. Trump’s proclamation legitimized a patient campaign to drive one-third of the Palestinian population from the city and absorb roughly 140,000 West Bank settlers by granting their settlements sub-municipality status and ultimately allowing them to vote in municipal elections. At the same time, according to a public opinion poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research published on December 12, “The American step increases Abbas’s weakness, raises further suspicion concerning the role of regional powers, and increases calls for armed action.” The right wing may be savoring its triumph, but ultimately both the Palestinians and Israelis—certainly in Jerusalem, where the two maintain a delicate balance of daily relations—lose big.
Continuities and Discontinuities
Nadia Nasser-Najjab
Nadia Nasser-Najjab, an associate research fellow at the European Center for Palestine Studies at the University of Exeter.
In the Arab Israeli conflict, Palestinians have been frequently treated as an irrelevance or even an irritant—the very notion of a Palestinian “problem” suggests a vexed superpower forced to descend from its lofty vantage-point. Trump’s recent recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel is the latest iteration of this mindset.
It is perhaps inevitable, given his own propensity for self-publicity, that so much of the current discussion is focused on Trump. The tone of the righteous outrage that has accompanied this decision leads us to believe that he has somehow erred from the righteous path of U.S. state practice. Observers accuse Trump of fundamentally breaking with the underpinning principle of the peace process, an accusation that cannot be upheld. The Oslo Accords were, from their inception, grounded within various degrees of force. During their implementation, they served as a veritable case study of unilateral imposition.
This does not absent Trump of his responsibility for his deeply dangerous action. However, within the wider colonial context, Trump’s decision appears as the logical continuation of a mindset that that viewed Palestine as a “land without a people for a people without a land,” leading to the design and implementation of the absentees’ property laws, which were used in 1967 to justify annexing East Jerusalem, overnight transforming Palestinians who had lived in Jerusalem for generations into “residents.”
It was not extreme demagogues such as Donald Trump, Menachem Begin, or Benjamin Netanyahu who enacted these policies. Rather, it was the practitioners of “enlightened occupation” (a phrase of Moshe Dayan’s). Trump, in justifying his actions, similarly appealed to Israel’s status as an established democracy and its commitment to liberal traditions such as freedom of worship. This of course overlooks the fact that, Israel, along with other historical examples of colonialism, combines progressive and regressive components.
It therefore appears that the assorted coterie of statesmen, diplomats, and journalists who have come out against Trump’s announcement primarily object to its tone. It represents, as with virtually other aspects of his presidency, an abrupt break with established protocols and procedures. However, it scarcely needs to be stated that their outrage was considerably more muted, and even entirely absent, when colonial power was exercised with greater nuance, subtlety and sophistication.
