Commentary
Ulrich Kühn
{
"authors": [
"Ulrich Kühn"
],
"type": "other",
"centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
"centers": [
"Carnegie Endowment for International Peace"
],
"collections": [
"U.S. Nuclear Policy"
],
"englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
"nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
"primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
"programAffiliation": "NPP",
"programs": [
"Nuclear Policy"
],
"projects": [],
"regions": [
"North America",
"United States"
],
"topics": [
"Security",
"Nuclear Policy"
]
}
Source: Getty
Other
Deterrence and Its Discontents
Why the United States does not currently have a long-term strategy for dealing with its most fundamental foreign policy challenges and why it needs one.
By Ulrich Kühn
Published on Jun 26, 2018
Source: Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Abstract
What might Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, have found, had he lived long enough to study the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review and its drafters? Anxiety about failure and death, fear of impotence, and an obsession with deterrence that obscures the ultimate question: “What is it that the United States wants in this world?” In this essay, the author uses psychoanalytic metaphors to explain why the United States does not currently have a long-term strategy for dealing with its most fundamental foreign policy challenges – and why it needs one, particularly as regards the global nuclear dilemma.
Imagine for a second that Sigmund Freud were to analyze the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). He would quickly encounter strong feelings of anxiety and unhappiness that the drafters of the NPR seem to express when writing about nuclear deterrence. Anxiety about failure, and ultimately death, is omnipresent in the document and is met by prescriptions for more nuclear capabilities. Fear of impotence – in the form of unhappiness with the restraints that nuclear deterrence puts on the natural instinct of aggression – is answered in the NPR by the lowering of the threshold to nuclear use. But ultimately, when digging deeper into the document, Freud would come across an obsession with deterrence, one that saves and prevents the “American patient” from asking the ultimate question: “What is it that I want in this world?”
This article was originally published in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
About the Author
Ulrich Kühn
Former Nonresident Scholar, Nuclear Policy Program
Ulrich Kühn was a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
- Why Arms Control Is (Almost) Dead
- Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO PlaybookReport
Ulrich Kühn
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- The U.S. Has Weapons in Space. Now What?Commentary
The acknowledgment has sparked fears of a new arms race with China and Russia.
Chris O’Meara
- What Canada Knows About American PowerPaper
Smaller powers cannot go it alone, but Canadian history shows that integration with the United States will not always be benign.
Paul Samson
- Trump Had the Chance to Address U.S.-China AI Safety. He Threw Xi a Party Instead.Commentary
The summit may be remembered as a fatal blunder, when Washington, Beijing, and the AI industry collectively chose ceremony over action.
Jeffrey Prescott
- Separable, not Separate: Governing Europe’s Collective DefenseArticle
European NATO countries are wrestling with the possibility of U.S. disengagement from the alliance. With the continent’s security increasingly uncertain, governments must restore the credibility of their collective defense.
Hans-Dieter Lucas, Adam Thomson, Pierre Vimont
- Squandering Attraction: How the Second Trump Administration is Undermining American Soft PowerPaper
Soft power on its own is insufficient to meet U.S. national security needs, but hard power also has its limits. Soft power allows for more effective and efficient use of hard power than hard power alone, as it encourages cooperation and compliance which deters the need for hard power.
Sarah Yerkes
