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The Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program works to strengthen international security by diagnosing acute nuclear risks, informing debates on solutions, and engaging international actors to effect change. The program’s work spans deterrence, disarmament, nonproliferation, nuclear security, and nuclear energy.More about the program >
Bilateral arms control between the United States and Russia now rests entirely on New START, which will expire in 2026 if not sooner. What steps could build on this treaty, and how can China and other nuclear states be brought into the arms control process?
The United States faces a series of critically important decisions on nuclear procurement, posture, and declaratory policy. Which policies will best ensure effective deterrence while minimizing the risks of escalation and arms racing?
North Korea’s evolving nuclear arsenal presents a complex security challenge. What can states and international organizations do to reduce immediate nuclear risks while planning for a longer term disarmament process?
Nuclear and non-nuclear weapons and systems are becoming increasingly entangled, raising the risks of inadvertent escalation in a conflict. How can these dangers be mitigated?
The system of treaties, agreements, and institutions underpinning the nonproliferation regime is increasingly stressed by burgeoning arms races and growing discord over the lack of progress toward disarmament. What steps can be taken to halt, and if possible, reverse this trend?
Russia’s anti-satellite missile test has heightened the risk of dangerous collisions between objects in space. International norms are urgently needed to prevent future tests like this and to keep Earth’s orbits as safe as possible.
China’s recent tests of a novel nuclear-weapon delivery system may not represent a new threat to the United States. But they should prompt the development of a new diplomatic strategy to prevent a dangerous arms race.
The IAEA director general and U.S. secretary of state have recently voiced heightened concerns over the direction of Iran’s nuclear program and frustrations with the lack of diplomatic progress. Yet these developments are entirely predictable for those who closely study the logic behind Iran’s nuclear ambitions and patterns of behavior.
Satellite data has revealed the construction of new nuclear missile silos in Gansu and Xinjiang in western China. How U.S. and Chinese experts interpret the buildup and the motivations behind it could greatly reshape their security relationship.
While hopes remain for a reboot of nuclear talks with North Korea, a crucial but oft-overlooked question is how compliance with any negotiated agreement would be monitored and verified.
Several developments since the landmark nuclear agreement with Iran was signed in 2015 cast doubt about its ability to hold Iran back from approaching the nuclear threshold. Can the goals of the original deal still be attained?
Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Fiona Cunningham is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and was a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow in 2020-21.
Dalton is the co-director and a senior fellow of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment. An expert on nonproliferation and nuclear energy, his work addresses regional security challenges and the evolution of the global nuclear order.
Rose Gottemoeller is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. She also serves as the Frank E. and Arthur W. Payne Distinguished Lecturer at Stanford University’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Hibbs is a Germany-based nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program. His areas of expertise are nuclear verification and safeguards, multilateral nuclear trade policy, international nuclear cooperation, and nonproliferation arrangements.
Kassenova is a nonresident fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
Ulrich Kühn is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the head of the arms control and emerging technologies program at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg.
Jamie Kwong is the Stanton pre-doctoral fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Levite was the principal deputy director general for policy at the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission from 2002 to 2007.
Thomas MacDonald is a fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Vipin Narang is a nonresident scholar in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Ankit Panda is the Stanton Senior Fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Perkovich works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues; cyberconflict; and new approaches to international public-private management of strategic technologies.
Ülgen is a visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe in Brussels, where his research focuses on Turkish foreign policy, nuclear policy, cyberpolicy, and transatlantic relations.
Tristan Volpe is a nonresident fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and assistant professor of defense analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Fumihiko Yoshida is a nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Tong Zhao is a senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program based at the Carnegie–Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.