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The Obama Administration and the Arab World’s Concerns: A Perspective From the Gulf

The Obama administration’s first mission in the Middle East centers around effectively resolving the set of grave challenges created by the outgoing administration’s flawed policies. These include the Iraqi crisis and Iranian influence in Iraq. Most importantly, the U.S. has to take serious and effective steps to resolve the traditional issues; mainly the Palestinian–Israeli conflict.

by Abdulaziz bin Othman bin Sager
Published on December 5, 2008

The Obama administration’s first mission in the Middle East centers around effectively resolving the set of grave challenges created by the outgoing administration’s flawed policies. These include the Iraqi crisis and Iranian influence in Iraq. Most importantly, the United States has to take serious and effective steps to resolve the traditional issues that still stand as obstacles to peace and stability in the region; mainly the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. 

In view of pressing domestic issues, it is unlikely that the new administration will seriously and fully engage in Middle East politics in its first year. However, what can be learned from the failed policies of the Bush administration and the nature of U.S. interests in the region is that the United States should move quickly toward addressing Middle Eastern issues especially because its Arab allies have seen the outgoing administration as a source of embarrassment if not a burden.
 
Therefore, Arabs hope that the new administration will assume a more effective and impartial role in brokering a settlement to the Arab–Israeli conflict that is not based on solely pressuring the Palestinian side while neglecting to address the causes of the conflict. Arabs also hope this new role does not only focus on isolating Syria or demanding that Arabs normalize relations with Israel before reaching a comprehensive and acceptable peace agreement. They also want the United States to stop turning a blind eye to Israel’s policies of aggression that threaten peace efforts.  
 
As for Iraq, during his campaign the president-elect proposed a gradual pullout to be completed within sixteen months. However, for this policy to succeed, he first has to take effective and productive steps that include strengthening the Iraqi military and police force, achieving real national reconciliation, supporting the rebuilding process, and facilitating a greater UN and regional role in stabilizing the country. Without careful examination and preparation, any withdrawal from Iraq might lead to a devastating civil war and transform the country into a center for terrorists and extremists. Such outcome would seriously undermine the U.S. standing in the world.
 
In spite of the dispute in the United States over decreasing the U.S. dependence on Middle East oil, it is most unlikely that the United States and its allies will be able to do so in the near future. Therefore, energy security should top the incoming administration’s priorities, especially because many countries are invested in the issue. The United States can play a more influential role in galvanizing efforts to achieve progress towards this goal.   
 
As for U.S.–Iran relations and their implications for the region, in principle Arabs and GCC countries do not find Obama’s plan to hold direct talks with Tehran a source of threat. On the contrary, they regard restoring normal ties between the two countries as a positive development that will maintain regional stability and security. What might be a cause of concern for Arabs and GCC countries is a U.S.–Iranian deal that comes at the expense of their strategic interests.  
 
The possibility of Obama pursuing a “comprehensive deal” will compel Tehran to bolster its influence in the region in order to be in a better negotiating position in talks with Washington. So next year Iran might escalate its intervention policy in the Arab world, particularly in the battlegrounds of Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine while continuing to protect its strategic alliance with Syria, an alliance that regional and international powers have tried to weaken. Iran will try to quicken U.S. withdrawal from Iraq by thwarting an agreement between Iraq and the United States authorizing continued  U.S. military presence in the country. Tehran will also throw its support behind the establishment of the so-called “Shi’i region” in the south of Iraq in case the Kurds announce their complete autonomy. Furthermore, Iran will continue to support Shi’i factions in Iraq in order to maintain its influence and achieve its strategic goals there.
 
The Iranian nuclear file and its handling by the United States are at the forefront of the issues that will impact the Gulf region in particular and the Arab world in general, particularly if economic sanctions fail to change Iran’s position.  Iran hopes that in any deal with the United States, Washington will agree to turn a blind eye to its nuclear program and allow it continue without significant American or international pressure. If the “comprehensive deal” with Iran fails to address the future of its nuclear program, then one of the following developments could occur: 
  • The United States will impose tougher nonmilitary sanctions (diplomatic, economic, and financial) that the Gulf countries will have to take into consideration in their future relations with Tehran.
  • If sanctions fail to force Iran to comply with international law and treaties, the military option will gain further international legitimacy and political acceptance.
  • Military action in the first year of the new administration remains quite unlikely as the new president will focus on bolstering his administration and handling national issues and will try to avoid any military venture abroad. However, without satisfactorily settling Iran’s nuclear file, the United States will increasingly face the possibility of dealing with an armed conflict. At the same time, Israel will attempt to avoid military action to spare the new administration any embarrassment, and is unlikely to resort to it unless it obtains information on a major breakthrough in Iranian acquisition of a nuclear weapon, or in case of a serious Iranian threat that justifies a military response. 
In conclusion, President-elect Obama and his cabinet have to work on containing the growing Iranian ambitions, but not at the expense of Gulf and Arab interests. They also have to deal with other sources of tension, such as the war in Iraq, the Arab–Israeli conflict, the war on terrorism, Darfur, and reforms in the region but within a new vision and policies that restore U.S. credibility, and restore stability and security in the region.
 
In all cases, change in U.S. Middle East policy depends on the success of Arab countries in devising joint visions and plans to manage their relations with the United States and other regional and international powers. Continuing reactionary policies and waiting for initiatives to emerge from Washington and other governments will not serve Arab interests, regardless of who is occupying the White House.
 
Abdulaziz Sager is Chairman and founder of the Gulf Research Center, UAE.
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.