In the more than two years since the Artemis Accords were envisioned, announced, and executed, considerable progress has been made. Twenty-three countries, including a large number of spacefaring countries, have signed the accords, which lay out a framework for a new era of space exploration. Although certain countries with highly developed space programs, such as Russia and China, have refrained from joining and instead criticized the accords, the Artemis mission has continued without any major glitches. Yet at the same time, getting India—a major spacefaring nation—to sign on to the accords has proven to be elusive so far. Considering that several major non–NATO allies have signed on to the accords, India’s absence is notable and all the more conspicuous given that it has been considering potential participation in the accords for well over a year now.
To be sure, India has signed an “implementation agreement” that is seen as a legal instrument related to the Artemis Accords. However, more importantly, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) is still not a partner agency when it comes to any of the missions conceived under the Artemis Accords. As India considers potential participation in the accords, it is worth exploring what could be the roadblocks.
Often, space is considered too esoteric or technical a topic to merit being put center stage in a bilateral relationship that is habitually too comfortable sticking to the usual talking points of defense cooperation, antiterrorism, climate change, agriculture, and, recently, semiconductors. Why space does not occupy a position commensurate with these other disciplines—why any talk of cooperation is limited to the Civil Space Joint Working Group’s (CSJWG) discussions—has become an increasingly important question. The answer to this question has several parts. First, “space is hard,” as the popular adage in the industry goes, and this leads to discussions that are mired in technicalities and necessitate the involvement of the countries’ respective space agencies. Second, working together on projects is a good way to gauge each other’s capabilities and gradually work together toward more ambitious missions. However, efforts must be made to infuse this bilateral space cooperation with a sense of vigor. Galvanizing cooperation here will require the issue of space to be treated on par with the more conventional areas of cooperation mentioned above.
The reason space deserves to be treated as a major vertical in its own right is that India’s capabilities in space affairs not only considerably outflank its budding know-how in other areas but compete with the best in the world. For instance, ISRO pivoted quickly when Russian space agency Roscosmos denied launch services to broadband satellite internet service OneWeb. ISRO managed to launch OneWeb’s batch of satellites within a few months of Russia’s denial and is on course to launch a second batch soon. It is also readying itself to launch a solar scientific mission dubbed Aditya-L1 to study and observe the sun, and in doing so will utilize a high-quality coronagraph payload, which could potentially revolutionize solar astronomy. Lastly, ISRO is seeking to become one of the few space actors, alongside SpaceX and possibly China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, to test and use successfully a reusable heavy-lift rocket dubbed the Next Generation Launch Vehicle. While India’s space know-how may trail that of the United States, there is still a need to elevate space cooperation to a status that reflects the capabilities of both India and the United States.
Compete or Cooperate?
Some observers may question the benefits of partnering with India—a spacefaring nation that was long caricatured as an outsider in the space club of mostly Western nations. The problems with India’s Chandrayaan-2 mission, its Small Satellite Launch Vehicle failure, pushed timelines for Gaganyaan (ISRO’s human spaceflight mission), and the absence of a space law or an overarching space policy suggest scope for improvement. However, to categorize the teething stage of India’s planetary exploration program as evidence of India’s limited space capabilities would be misleading. In recent years, India’s trajectory in the space sector has undergone a shift due to regulatory tailwinds.
For example, in the time since the Artemis Accords were announced, India has liberalized its space sector, outsourced the production of its reliable and long-used Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle, and witnessed unusually high levels of commercial interest in its space sector at a time when global funding has been below usual levels. Although India’s space economy is currently estimated at an abysmal 2 percent of the global space economy, which amounts to $7.6 billion (merely a quarter of the budget of NASA alone), these developments in India’s space sector attest to a larger trend: a willingness on part of the powers that be—namely ISRO and the Indian National Space Promotion and Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe)—to open up India’s space sector and compete for a larger slice of the pie of the global space economy.
Not getting India to sign onto the Artemis Accords would be a missed opportunity. It could even risk accelerating the fragmentation of the global space regime into different blocs. A case in point is the United States’ Wolf Amendment of 2011, which prohibits cooperation between NASA and China’s space program on grounds of human rights violations by China. The consensus—even among many in the United States—is that the Wolf Amendment hastened Chinese space-tech innovation and was of limited utility in persuading U.S. allies to curb their space cooperation activities with China. In 2021, even the vice chief of space operations for the U.S. Space Force stated that China was developing its space capabilities at twice the rate of the United States.
This example is instructive and relevant for India as well. ISRO was stymied in its efforts to come up with a completely indigenous launch vehicle that could launch heavier payloads to the geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO). This was due to an earlier stringent U.S. policy that discouraged the sale of cryogenic engines to countries that the United States feared could use them to power military projectiles. Despite this, ISRO was able to develop and launch the GSLV Mark III rocket, which catapulted India into the league of nations that have developed an indigenous launch vehicle capable of launching heavy payloads to the GTO. Thus India was able not only to get around the sanctions, but also to design an indigenous medium-lift launch vehicle.
Given that space exploration activities are concentrated around a few nations, it is likely that these nations will fuse their space-industrial bases with each other to drive these activities. These fused bases are likely to include entire ecosystems comprising research labs, start-ups, universities, and funders. More importantly, since the commercial sector is increasingly fostering many of these new technologies in both India and the United States, rather than the traditional defense industrial base, it is becoming important to ensure that these sensitive technologies are not subject to foreign influence—which underscores the need for like-minded nations like India and the United States to work together.
Reforming the CSJWG
India and the United States have been cooperating on space endeavors since 1963, when India launched its first sounding rocket, the Nike Apache, with U.S. contribution. Over the years, the two countries have sought to put this cooperation under overarching bilateral initiatives. For instance, in January 2004, in order to ensure progress in U.S.-India relations, the governments decided to embark on an initiative called Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, which would expand bilateral cooperation from traditional areas such as education, agriculture, military-to-military relations, counterterrorism, and trade to newer areas such as civil space, civil nuclear energy, missile defense, and high-technology cooperation. To further expand civil space cooperation, the CSJWG was formed in 2005 between the United States and India.
So far, the CSJWG has been the primary mode of addressing space cooperation. While the recent Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET) seeks to expand U.S.-India cooperation in the space sector, it serves more as a framework. And, again, the spadework for any talks on space will need to be done through the CSJWG, which now includes a new component that allows commercial actors to engage with each other as well. However, some stakeholders and actors in the space industry feel that the CSJWG could do better. The perception appears to stem from the fact that over the last eighteen years, civil space cooperation between the United States and India has resulted in only a few noteworthy outcomes. While the Chandrayaan-1 mission of 2012 carried two U.S payloads and was a huge success, the most significant milestone for the CSJWG has been the recent NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) mission, which seeks to use advanced radar imaging to survey land-surface changes. However, even this project took nearly a decade to come to fruition after its announcement.
The CSJWG is generally regarded among commercial actors in the ecosystem as a welcome mechanism to pursue civil space cooperation. However, the composition of the CSJWG is limited to officials from the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, ISRO centers, the Indian Ministry of Earth Sciences, or the Department of Science and Technology. On the U.S. side, the participants usually comprise officials from NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the U.S. Geological Survey, U.S. Strategic Command, the U.S. Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Air Force. One strategy that could help augment decisionmaking on space matters is a commitment to include the CSJWG in a biannual discussion between the key decisionmakers on both sides.
From India, this should involve the Space Commission—a high-powered body that includes the national security adviser, the cabinet secretary, the foreign secretary, the principal secretary to the prime minister, the ISRO chairperson, the IN-SPACe chairperson and the principal scientific adviser to the Indian government, among other key officials. On the U.S. side, this should include the members of the National Space Council, under the leadership of its chair, the vice president of the United States.
Unless both sides decide to opt for a bolder and more imaginative approach, space cooperation may not move at the pace they intend. And this may serve to hinder the pace at which India considers the adoption of the Artemis Accords. A more refined, direct, and empowered mechanism to propel talks and engage in outcome-oriented discussions might help both sides. The CSJWG does not have to remain the sole arbiter of matters related to space cooperation with the United States and could instead work to augment the decisions made at meetings between the Indian Space Commission and the American National Space Council.
That being said, below are three ways for both India and the United States to inch closer to each other on space cooperation.
India
Clarity on Principles Related to the Artemis Accords
The Artemis Accords are essentially a multilateral arrangement between the signing nations and are aimed at landing humans on the moon again by 2025 through a series of missions. However, at the heart of the matter are the Artemis Accords themselves, which have been signed by various countries with the United States and govern how lunar exploration under the Artemis missions will proceed. Although the agreements are nonbinding, they are reflective of the principles espoused by the signatory countries. The accords themselves have thirteen provisions. While many of these provisions are believed to be in concurrence with the principles of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST)—the seminal and landmark treaty governing space exploration activities—some provisions are more controversial, especially Section 10, which allows for the “extraction and utilization of space resources.” While the agreement includes a caveat mandating that this should be done in a manner that complies with the OST, many jurists and international space partners of the United States have argued that this constitutes “a U.S.-friendly interpretation of international space law, particularly regarding the ownership of space-based resources.”
While India is still considering participation in the accords, the degree of interest among Indian commentators ranges from lukewarm to positive. In this context, India must consider where it stands on the issue of the utilization of lunar and space resources, and whether signing the Artemis Accords would deviate from that stance or conform to it. In this regard, India can look to Australia for how to navigate any conflicts between the OST and the Artemis Accords. Australia is a signatory to the Moon Agreement, which declares that the moon and its resources belong to the common heritage of mankind—a diametrically opposite stance from that of the Artemis Accords. Despite any misgivings Australia may have about the Artemis Accords, it signed them in February 2022.
Clarity on Space Policy
If Indian space companies are to benefit from co-development opportunities or joint ventures with their American counterparts, they need to know what is permissible and what is not. This would require clarity on how space activities are treated under Indian law. Given that much of the space economy is about leveraging competitive advantages in outer space to meet demands originating from Earth, a lack of clarity can be a hurdle for Indian space companies. To begin with, India can look at providing regulatory clarity on things like liability insurance in the space sector.
Clarity on Areas That Will Benefit From Cooperation
India needs to think about the areas that may benefit from cooperation under the Artemis missions. NASA is not developing all the technological components by itself, and India should consider whether future missions under the Artemis program could benefit from Indian expertise in areas like the Gateway project (an orbiting lunar outpost), resupply missions, and any further activities that may be planned on the lunar surface. The International Space Exploration Coordination Group maintains a list of critical technologies needed for space exploration activities. These technologies, per experts,1 are not off-the-shelf technologies and would instead need regular R&D investment. Perhaps India can identify areas that are currently underserved by other partner nations, where investing in R&D capabilities makes business sense.
An area of interest for Indian companies should be NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS) program, which was created to help the Artemis missions by delivering commercial and international payloads to the moon. The NASA Inspector General’s office clarified that under the CLPS, “rather than NASA controlling or overseeing the contractor’s designs, systems, processes, or infrastructure, the Agency purchases a service from the company using a firm-fixed-price contract.” The reason CLPS represents an opportunity for Indian enterprises is that the companies that deliver these services are at liberty regarding how to manage their own supply chains, subject to the usual restrictions on foreign ownership and funding. Encouragingly, the White House’s iCET factsheet explicitly points out CLPS as an opportunity for Indian and American companies to collaborate and states that by early 2024, NASA and ISRO will convene U.S. and Indian companies to advance this initiative.
United States
Structuring Agreements
Currently, NASA has entered into fifty-four Artemis-related instruments with foreign partners. These include some binding and some nonbinding agreements, depending on the formal nomenclature that is provided for the instrument by both NASA and the partner agency, since different types of instruments entail different obligations. Furthermore, it should be pointed out that there is a misperception among some observers that signing the Artemis Accords obligates the signatory nation to participate in the Artemis missions. This is incorrect. To participate in NASA’s lunar exploration missions, the signatory party must enter into a separate agreement with NASA that describes the level of its participation in the Artemis missions. This is important because it means that the Artemis Accords themselves do not operate a singular framework governing the Artemis missions; instead, there are many agreements that determine the specificities.
This may lead to a fragmented approach toward the Artemis missions; currently, there is a lack of an “overarching strategy” to coordinate Artemis contributions among several partners. This is distinct from NASA’s prior approach to the International Space Station (ISS) program, where there was a comprehensive forum to discuss topics related to the operation of the ISS among partner nations. A real-time virtual dashboard, accessible to partner agencies, that tracks the contributions of each agency to the Artemis program would be helpful. This would be similar to the existing Tactical Planning System (TPS) that is used for the ISS by NASA. Under the TPS, data is exchanged and disseminated among international partners. The European Space Agency has a corresponding system, the Mission Management Support Tools, that is interoperable with the TPS. Overall, these mechanisms support information exchange among all partners on various aspects of the ISS. A recent Government Accountability Office report found that while NASA does have schedule management systems for the Artemis missions, these are more suited for individual missions than for multiprogram missions.
Funding
A report by the U.S. Office of Inspector General (OIG) stated that the Artemis missions are projected to cost NASA approximately $93 billion between 2012 and 2025. Considering that currently, a mere 6 percent of the total costs are borne by international partners (in contrast with the ISS program, where partners contribute approximately 25 percent of the costs incurred to run the U.S. segment of the ISS). Considering the wider scope of the Artemis missions compared to the ISS, it is possible that international partners may be asked to pitch in a higher proportion of the costs down the line.
Currently, the funding model adopted for the Artemis missions is a “capabilities model” where each partner’s contribution is determined at the outset and the contribution is limited to providing a particular technical capability related to the Artemis missions. The OIG found that using this model “reduces accounting, reduces unbounded obligations on both NASA and the international partners, and enables partners to provide contributions in the future to grow the partnership.” It is true that this model reduces open-ended obligations. However, as the missions grow in complexity, scope, and duration, it may be worthwhile to consider the ISS model, where the percentage of costs contributed by a partner is equivalent to the partner’s utilization of the ISS. Therefore, each partner ends up paying an amount corresponding to the benefit that they derive from the ISS program. Currently, ISRO largely enters into “project-specific agreements” with NASA—which are not based on a “capabilities model” but instead on reimbursable agreements.
It is also important to note that the procurement models of most partner nations may also need tweaking or need to be aligned, at least for space missions like the Artemis missions, as these have an impact on the costs of the missions as well. Fixed-price contracts are generally seen as safer, since they see less escalation in costs during the development process. In contrast, the cost-reimbursement models often lead to considerable cost overruns. Syncing the procurement models of participatory countries might help keep costs from inflating.
Export Control Restrictions
Export controls continue to have a restrictive effect on international cooperation in the Artemis missions. As the missions expand and take on more partners, the likelihood of incorporation of distinct space flight operation systems will also increase. This will necessitate the use of foreign astronauts to operate these systems. However, certain International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) rules may hinder such use. For instance, the OIG report pointed out that under the current rules, foreign astronauts can only receive classified information once they are assigned to a mission, and even then, such approval is in force only while the mission is operative. This hinders sharing of mission-critical information by the astronauts once they return to Earth.
Additionally certain technology that was relevant for the operation of the ISS was given a unique Export Administration Regulations (EAR) classification and removed from the ITAR, while the Artemis missions do not have any similar mechanism. While NASA requested an EAR classification system for the orbiting Gateway module under the Artemis program in 2021, approval for that is still pending.
Another problem with the ITAR/EAR distinction for certain technologies is that while each individual technology by itself may be classified under either EAR or ITAR, it is possible that upon combining it with other technologies, the export control classification may undergo a change. This makes the task of reaching regulatory certainty regarding the applicable classification more demanding.
It is not clear whether the NISAR satellite that was recently transferred from the United States to India included technologies that were subject to ITAR as well as EAR classifications. If so, perhaps it is worth exploring whether a model can be explored where dedicated project teams dealing with export control hurdles are formed around international partnerships. Perhaps the James Webb Space Telescope project’s success in resolving export control impediments can serve as a model for emulation.
The Need of the Hour
As India moves toward a range of international technology partnerships under the iCET, the I2U2 Group, and perhaps even AUKUS, smoothing of potential pain points will require clarity on internal policy positions. The Artemis Accords would be no different, even though they are narrower in scope. Similarly, the United States, being the foremost global pioneer when it comes to space exploration, should consider how it can enhance the coalition of nations that may be interested in space exploration activities by addressing issues such as each participant’s potential contribution, funding, and export control measures. Space has always captured and catapulted the imagination when it comes to achieving scientific breakthroughs. It may be time now to do the same in the policy realm.
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