President Joe Biden delivers remarks alongside Kenyan President William Ruto during an arrival ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on May 23, 2024
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A Stronger U.S.-Kenya Partnership Must Center the Kenyan People

Protests have revealed divisions between Kenya’s political elites and its public. The United States should listen to the people’s demands for accountable governance.

Published on August 20, 2024

President William Ruto’s state visit to the United States in May 2024, the first by an African leader in sixteen years, signaled the strengthening of U.S.-Kenya ties. As one of Africa’s more consolidated democracies and a reliable counterterrorism ally, Kenya has emerged as the United States’ partner of choice on the continent.

Yet only a few weeks after the state visit, Kenya made headlines for very different reasons. When youth-led protests broke out in response to the Kenya Finance Bill 2024, a proposed law raising new taxes on everyday necessities, Ruto’s government cracked down harshly. State security forces killed at least fifty demonstrators and abducted and tortured at least thirty-four others. Ruto himself derided the protesters as “treasonous” and “criminals.” The scale of the protests eventually forced Ruto to make several concessions, from withdrawing the bill to reconstituting his cabinet. Yet civil unrest continues, as do the crackdowns.

For many protesters and human rights activists, the government’s repressive response belies the democratic values celebrated during Ruto’s trip to Washington. Consequently, these actors have urged the Biden administration to leverage its close relationship with Ruto to push for dialogue and de-escalation. Yet the initial U.S. government response was muted, limited to a joint statement with several other Western nations expressing “concern.” A second U.S. government statement, released five weeks into the political turmoil, stayed clear of implicating the Kenyan government in the ongoing violence or expressing direct solidarity with the demonstrations, instead devolving blame to protesters and police.

The Biden administration’s restrained response to the crackdown reflects the challenge of calling out abuses committed by a critical geopolitical ally. At the same time, if Kenyans view the United States as inconsiderate of the Kenyan people’s position during this political unrest, they are likely to view their country’s partnership with the United States with suspicion. As Washington strives to position itself as a closer geopolitical ally and economic partner to African countries, it should ensure that ordinary citizens understand the U.S. government partnership also benefits them, not just their ruling elites.

Mounting domestic discontent

Over the past two decades, Kenya has established itself as a reliable partner to the United States. The country has a robust private sector and attracts large amounts of U.S. foreign direct investment. Kenya is also a strong security partner: alongside Somalia, Kenya is the top recipient of U.S. counterterrorism assistance in Africa. This security partnership deepened in 2023 when Kenya offered to supply the police force for the U.S-backed Multinational Security Support Mission to Haiti. In May 2024, Biden designated Kenya a Major Non-NATO Ally, making it the first sub-Saharan nation to attain this status. Kenya’s rapprochement with the United States is especially notable at a time when a series of military coups have disrupted key U.S. security partnerships in Africa.

Yet while Kenya has garnered international prestige, discontent with the Ruto government has been mounting at home. Ruto was elected in 2022 during a cost-of-living crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, a regional drought, and supply chain disruptions caused by the start of the war in Ukraine. His populist economic campaign platform appealed to the country’s youth and economically disadvantaged—the two demographics that had been hardest hit by inflation.

Once in office, however, Ruto’s economic promises clashed with the reality of Kenya’s substantial debt burden. As of 2024, debt comprises 73 percent of Kenya’s GDP, a problem exacerbated by Ruto’s predecessors taking out loans to finance large-scale infrastructure projects. Ruto faced significant pressure to meet IMF fiscal deficit targets and prevent default. He swiftly abandoned his populist  “hustler nation” policies, moving instead to address the deficit.

The Kenya Finance Bill was meant to raise $2.7 billion in revenue through a 16 percent tax on everyday necessities such as bread, cooking oil, car fuel, sanitary pads, and other indispensable goods. It would have further raised the cost of living in a country where more than one-fifth of the population lives on less than $2.15 a day.

In response, thousands of protesters took to the streets to voice their opposition. While Gen Z Kenyans have led the charge, they enjoy support from broad swaths of Kenyan society and the diaspora. In a country marked by ethnic cleavages, public outrage at the proposed tax hikes has transcended ethnic and regional divides. The government’s brutal response has only broadened the movement. Although Ruto has since withdrawn the unpopular bill, demonstrators are now calling for him to resign.

What began as targeted opposition against proposed tax hikes has thus morphed into a larger mobilization for political and economic change. Kenyans have long felt that the foreign loan money and tax revenue collected by their government was being mismanaged. According to Afrobarometer data, 50 percent of Kenyans would prefer to pay lower taxes even if it meant fewer government services. Most doubt whether “the government uses tax revenues for the well-being of citizens.”

Protesters quickly identified examples of wasteful government spending. Ruto’s state visit to the United States has emerged as one such example: rather than using the country’s national airline, he chartered a $1.5-million private jet for his trip. On social media, Kenyans have also circulated infographics comparing the costs of watches and outfits worn by government officials to average Kenyan salaries or the cost of public goods. The message is clear: many protesters feel that their taxes are being used to finance the luxurious lifestyles of political elites rather than the provision of public services.

Critics of the government have also called out institutionalized forms of corruption. They have noted that the position of chief administrative secretary, created by former president Uhuru Kenyatta to reward his political allies, costs Kenyan taxpayers over 200 million shillings (about $1.5 million) each year in salaries alone. Even though Kenyan courts have repeatedly disputed the constitutionality of these appointments, Ruto sought to further increase the number of chief administrative secretaries, at an expected cost of 460 million shillings (about $3.5 million) a year. The protests have forced Ruto to delay these appointments, as well as to stop funding the offices of the first lady, second lady, and the wife of the prime Cabinet secretary—unelected positions that many Kenyans view as undeserving of public resources.

International actors come under fire

The bulk of popular discontent has centered on Kenyan political elites. Yet the protests have also surfaced dissatisfaction with international actors viewed as undermining the interests of the Kenyan people.

Kenya owes most of its debt to three lenders: the World Bank, the IMF, and China. However, many Kenyans see the World Bank and IMF in particular as guilty of exacerbating the cost of living crisis. The Kenya Finance Bill 2024 was itself the product of a comprehensive reform package agreement between Kenya and the IMF. The IMF initially praised the bill as a “sizable and upfront fiscal adjustment” necessary to make up for the shortfall in tax revenue. Protesters therefore fault the country’s multilateral creditors for cosigning the Kenyan government’s efforts to shift the debt repayment burden to low-income Kenyans. Slogans such as “Kenya is not IMF’s lab rat” or “IMF & World Bank: Modern Day Slavery” have been a common feature of the anti-finance bill demonstrations.

Although the United States has long enjoyed favorable perceptions among Kenyans, the protests have also highlighted growing anti-American sentiments. Because the United States is the largest financial contributor to the IMF and the largest shareholder at the World Bank, some protesters view the U.S. government as partially responsible for the proposed tax hikes. More broadly, many protesters question whether the U.S.-Kenya partnership serves ordinary Kenyans. Potential benefits of this partnership, such as the Nairobi-Washington Vision which commits the United States to mobilizing resources for debt-saddled countries, have been overshadowed by Washington’s perceived silence about the unfolding human rights violations, including the murders of protesters and the torturing of journalists and activists. Some activists have argued that the U.S. government “cares more about [the Ruto administration] being in power [than] the wellness of the citizens of Kenya.”

Long-standing criticisms that Ruto is “a puppet of the West” have become more mainstream. Kenyans have dubbed Ruto “the flying president” due to his frequent overseas travel to conferences and state visits, and many view his foreign policy ambitions as undercutting his domestic responsibilities. The state visit to Washington only fueled this perception, as did Ruto’s decision to supply the police force for the U.S.-government-backed mission to Haiti. Doing so required Ruto to circumvent the Kenyan High Court, which had ruled the deployment unconstitutional in January and again attempted to block it in May. To Ruto’s critics, the mission is emblematic of the president’s disregard for the separation of powers. Some Kenyans also question how Kenyan police could restore order in Haiti when they often fail to do so back home, frequently escalating interactions with civilians through violence. Biden’s refusal to send any American troops to Haiti fueled the critique that the U.S. government has committed Kenya to meddling in a crisis from which Kenyans are far removed.

Why Kenyan public opinion matters for U.S. foreign policy

Over the past three decades, the United States has invested significant resources in strengthening Kenyan democracy. Yet in this moment of political turmoil, Washington’s perceived complicity in the proposed austerity measures, its close ties with the Ruto government, and its relative silence about the crackdown on protesters have reinforced the perception that the U.S.-Kenya partnership is leaving the Kenyan people behind.

It is possible that the U.S. government has used quiet diplomatic channels to encourage the Ruto administration to restrain its use of force and take heed of popular demands. But private diplomatic engagement does little to alter Kenyan public opinion. Instead, the U.S. government’s public celebration of Kenyan democracy risks being perceived as tone deaf and out of sync with Kenyans’ demands for more accountable governance.

To counter these perceptions, Washington needs to more outwardly express its solidarity with the Kenyan people’s calls for more responsive democracy. The U.S. government should bolster its partnership not just with the executive but also through renewed support for Kenyan institutions that serve as checks on presidential power, including the courts, media, and civil society. Such support should not only be financial but also political. The U.S. government should back these institutions, publicly and privately, when they assert constitutional checks and balances. Recent U.S. government actions and inactions—from its perceived silence on the crackdowns against civil society to its support for Ruto’s Haiti deployment despite Kenyan court orders—have placed U.S. policy at odds with these very actors and institutions.

The U.S. government should also ensure that its economic and security ties with the Kenyan government do not inadvertently bolster unaccountable behavior by Kenyan elites. In practice, this could mean doubling down on anticorruption efforts in line with the Biden administration’s Strategy on Countering Corruption. Further, the U.S. government should leverage its partnership to push the Kenyan government to impose more austerity on itself, not just its people. The United States should also collaborate with Kenya and the IMF to align proposed economic reforms with human rights.

Ultimately, signaling a commitment to the Kenyan people is necessary to ensure the longevity of the U.S.-Kenya relationship. A strong and prosperous bilateral relationship with Kenya cannot hinge on connections with political elites—let alone elites widely perceived as unaccountable and undemocratic. Governments change all the time, and anti-Western regimes increasingly enjoy significant popular support precisely because of their anti-Western dispositions. Securing an alliance that endures across regimes should be a top priority for the United States. As things currently stand, the U.S. government has the Ruto government as an ally, but it risks losing the Kenyan people.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.