With the end of most direct U.S. financial and military assistance to Ukraine in early 2025, Europe has emerged as the country’s most important financial and military supporter, seeing its survival as essential to the continent’s future security and stability. However, Europe continues to struggle to respond promptly and adequately to Ukraine’s needs as the war continues and as Russia’s escalating campaign of drone and missile strikes increases its costs. In addition, the region’s economic weaknesses are straining national government budgets and are being exploited by political forces hostile to Ukraine. Meanwhile, President Volodymyr Zelensky is demanding additional funding and rapid EU membership for Ukraine, which at times irritates even his strongest backers among EU member states. Sustaining support for the country in this context will not be easy. EU and member-state leaders will need to show the political will and flexibility to adjust to Ukraine’s changing needs and to find compromises that will put support on a sustainable, long-term footing.

The Strategic Imperative for Europe

Most European leaders now view the continent’s security as intrinsically tied to that of Ukraine; they see no alternative to doing what is necessary to sustain Ukraine’s ability to combat Russian aggression. Since early 2025, they have scrambled to fill the gap left by the virtual end of U.S. assistance (see figure 1), and as they increased their financial and military support for Ukraine, the political stakes of a possible Ukrainian defeat for the EU’s credibility as a geopolitical actor has also increased. Possible U.S. concessions to Russia on European security have severely undermined Europe’s faith in the United States security guarantee, making the role of Ukraine’s innovative and battle-tested military more central to the future of Europe’s ability to defend itself.¹²

Most European leaders now view the continent’s security as intrinsically tied to Ukraine; they see no alternative to doing what is necessary to sustain Ukraine’s ability to combat Russian aggression.

The impetus to keep Ukraine afloat has prompted the EU and national governments to innovate and cross many longstanding policy redlines. The EU, for example, has found off-budget ways to finance its ever-larger share of military assistance to the country, skirting prohibitions on providing military assistance through its regular budget. Germany, which previously did not send military assistance in areas of active conflict, has become Ukraine’s largest funder since the United States ceased to provide such aid in 2025. The Nordic countries have ramped up their support for Ukraine even faster in relative terms.³ Meanwhile, Ukraine’s EU membership prospects, which were essentially moribund until 2022, have improved greatly, with the start of official negotiations with the EU on four of the six major clusters of requirements for accession since June.⁴

Ukraine’s Ballooning Needs

European support for Ukraine comes through a mix of EU and bilateral assistance. Whereas bilateral donations and funding have constituted the majority of Europe’s military assistance, almost 90 percent of all its financial and humanitarian aid is routed through EU instruments. The EU’s €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan (USL) that was finalized in April is now the most important single element of overall, not only European, aid through the end of 2027.⁵ In addition to stabilizing Ukraine’s fiscal situation, at least through the end of 2026, the loan has given the EU a major new role in helping the country build up its military strength, invest in its indigenous defense-industrial capacity, and procure weaponry it is not yet able to manufacture.⁶ From the loan, €60 billion is designated for military spending, much of which will be used to finance military production in Ukraine, thus providing a knock-on stimulant for its struggling economy.⁷ The remaining €30 billion is for budgetary support and supplements the latest IMF program, which is worth about €7 billion for 2026–2030.⁸ The EU has disbursed about €15 billion of the USL, with just under €30 billion of the 2026 money still available as of mid-October. Another €4.4 billion of budget aid is also available under the separate Ukraine Facility, subject to fulfillment of EU conditionality requirements, according to the Commission.⁹

These sums, while considerable, still fall short of Ukraine’s ballooning needs. As long as the war continues, Europe will need to adjust its support based on facts on the ground. Already late last year, analysts were sounding the alarm that the government’s 2026 budget significantly underestimated the country’s military needs.¹⁰ This summer, Zelensky asked the EU to advance some of the loan funding designated for 2027; the intensified Russian strikes on the energy infrastructure and their impact on grain exports will almost certainly worsen the fiscal situation.¹¹ While EU institutions turned down the request for additional funding for this year, EU officials now estimate a funding gap in 2027 that could be as big as €70 billion over and above the USL, with €40 billion of that gap for defense needs and €30 billion for budget support.¹² European leaders are now debating what to do next.

Politics Complicating Bilateral Aid

On top of aid packages that are pooled at the EU level and integrated with Ukraine’s IMF program, bilateral assistance from national governments—in-kind donations and financing for new weapons production—remains crucial for meeting Ukraine’s military needs. At their summit in Ankara in July, NATO members pledged to provide €70 billion for its military budget in each of the next two years,¹³ much of which will come for the EU loan. They rejected proposals to set specific obligations for each member’s support, however. Northern European countries, which now provide the lion’s share of military aid to Ukraine, are putting pressure on others to step up. Several governments, including those of Germany and Norway, have said they are reaching the limit of what they can provide while maintaining their own minimum stocks (see figure 2).¹⁴ These countries have also pushed for provisions in assistance to allow Ukraine to buy weapons not available domestically or in the EU from third countries. In September, the member states agreed to allow Kyiv to use the EU loan to buy Patriot interceptor missiles from the United States.¹⁵

A series of national elections in 2027 and political headwinds across Europe will undoubtedly complicate debates on supporting Ukraine. The deepening political crisis in Germany prompted by the rise of the nativist, far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) party—which has sharply criticized German military assistance to and overall EU funding for Ukraine—will likely make Berlin hesitant to provide new financial assistance beyond what it has already earmarked. In France, Marine Le Pen of the far-right National Rally is leading in opinion polls ahead of the presidential election in April–May 2027. (She is all but certain to place first in the initial round of voting due to her core support of at least 35 percent of the vote.¹⁶) Le Pen has strongly criticized EU spending on Ukraine and would likely scale back, if not end, assistance, should she win.¹⁷ Campaigning for parliamentary elections in Italy and Poland, which are likely to take place in fall 2027, could also lead their incumbent governments to oppose more funds for Ukraine to fend off opposition attacks that they are putting foreign interests before domestic needs. Even in Poland, where there is strong support for Ukraine’s war effort, the populist-right Law and Justice (PiS) party has criticized the government for providing military assistance that it claims undermines the country’s security.¹⁸

Frozen Russian Assets—The Option of Last Resort

Ukraine’s looming budget gap in 2027 and the reluctance of national governments to increase bilateral assistance suggest that the EU may need to consider alternative sources of financing. Since the summer, calls to tap frozen Russian sovereign assets in the EU have increased.¹⁹ These funds are available due to the quick action by the EU in early 2022 to sanction Russian sovereign assets, which resulted in the immobilization of about €210 billion, mostly held by Euroclear in Belgium. Initially, most member states were not willing to seize these funds outright due to the principle of sovereign immunity. In 2024, with the costs of supporting Ukraine rising and with prodding by the United States, the European Commission adopted a windfall profits regulation in order to tap the interest earned on the frozen assets. To date, this has resulted in Euroclear transferring €8 billion to the EU for Ukraine.²⁰

Ukraine’s looming budget gap in 2027 and the reluctance of national governments to increase bilateral assistance suggest that the EU may need to consider alternative sources of financing.

Last year, the European Commission—and, importantly, Germany—began pressing to use the frozen Russian assets directly to finance a new “reparations loan” package, but that plan was shelved due to opposition from Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia. Instead, the member states agreed to joint borrowing, a practice that France and southern member states want for other EU efforts and that Germany and other northern member states have traditionally opposed.²¹ Nevertheless, the frozen assets remain a potential source of funding for Ukraine.²² In August, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, and Sweden called on the European Commission to restart technical work on options to use the frozen assets to fund Ukraine.²³ Sweden argued this would be a way to avoid further pressure on national budgets, and in September the European Commission resumed work on developing options to use the assets.²⁴ Belgium, however, has hardened its opposition to tapping the funds, particularly since a Russian court ruled against the Belgian financial services company Euroclear, where most of the frozen assets are held.²⁵

Looking Ahead to the EU’s Next Budget

EU institutions and member states are now fully engaged in negotiations to agree on a new Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the union’s seven-year budget, which will set overall spending levels for the period from 2028 to 2034. The European Commission has proposed an almost €2 trillion MFF, and its president, Ursula von der Leyen, is seeking to prioritize defense and competitiveness as well as to gain added control over spending for the commission. The initial proposed budget earmarks €100 billion for Ukraine as the EU’s main source of nonmilitary support.²⁶ But this is still far below what the country will need for this period, especially if the war continues even for only part of it. As a result, even if the European Commission’s MFF proposal for Ukraine is approved by the member states, the EU will almost certainly need to provide additional ad hoc funding, with member states contributing to fill the gap. Moreover, because military spending at the EU level remains generally prohibited, it will remain off-budget.²⁷

Member states were strongly divided on the overall size and emphasis of the next MFF. At the European Council summit on October 15–16, some of Ukraine’s strongest backers (including Germany, Netherlands, and the Nordics) pushed for a significantly smaller increase in the MFF, while a coalition of seventeen other countries supported the Commission’s proposal to enlarge the budget but wanted it more focused on agriculture and regional funds for member states. European Council President Antonio Costa has called a special Council meeting on November 26–27 to try to bridge the differences in order to find a solution by the mid-December Council meeting.²⁸ France and Spain have pushed back against the notion that an agreement is needed this year, with French President Emmanuel Macron careful not to look like he is trying to short-circuit the influence of his successor in the final months of the election campaign.²⁹ Although MFF deliberations do not affect current spending, differences among the member states during them could spill over into Ukraine-related issues, and the November Council meeting will address Ukraine funding for next year as well as the MFF.³⁰ Longtime proponents of greater joint borrowing, such as Italy and Spain, will likely push for its further use and will probably seek greater spending on agriculture and regional funds from traditional budget hawks, such as Finland and Germany, in exchange for maintaining the earmark for Ukraine.

A Rocky Path Ahead on EU Integration 

The European Commission has declared that Russia’s war of aggression has made Ukraine’s membership in the EU a matter of geostrategic importance. The commission and supportive member states are navigating between two competing imperatives: upholding the principle that accession is a multistep, multiyear, conditions-based process, while providing Ukraine with more immediate and tangible incentives for reform that also provide a clear political signal to the country—and to Russia—that the EU is committed to its full accession. The EU has opened four of the six accession clusters this year, and Commission President von der Leyen expressed hope that the remaining clusters would be opened by the end of December.³¹ At the same time, the Commission used its annual report on enlargement, released in early October, to emphasize that the accession process must remain conditions-based with no set timeline, reflecting the rejection by most member states of a fast-track process for Ukraine. It also proposed special limits on Ukraine’s agricultural subsidies and market access. ³²

The EU’s financial disbursements to Ukraine are increasingly tied to the country’s progress on meeting the broad array of political and institutional requirements aimed at bringing it into accord with EU law and practice.³³ Disbursements have been delayed by Ukraine’s slow passage of EU-mandated reforms related to fighting corruption, taxation, and public governance.³⁴ Instability within the government in Kyiv, lawmakers’ resistance to certain politically sensitive EU-mandated reforms, and the frequent turnover in Ukraine’s negotiating team has also presented challenges to complying with accession requirements and threaten to delay the release of funds.³⁵

Ukraine’s demand for rapid EU membership and its tendency to reject proposals from the EU side that would provide it with interim measures as incentives while maintaining condition-based accession is also counterproductive. For example, Germany has proposed giving the country the right to send nonvoting representatives to EU institutions to participate in, and indirectly influence, decisionmaking prior to full membership.³⁶ Other proposals would provide phased integration. Ukraine has rejected these proposals as inadequate, but the EU’s accession criteria do not allow membership for a country at war, under martial law, and unable to support itself. In past rounds of enlargement, candidate countries often had to accept a slow process toward membership, followed by a transition period before being fully integrated into all EU policies and programs. Accepting interim steps while maintaining the goal of full membership, is the fastest way for Ukraine to achieve membership.

In addition, Ukraine has to make progress in meeting the EU criteria of the accession clusters already or soon to be opened, most importantly that on fundamental issues related to rule of law and governance, while avoiding bilateral irritants that could derail its moving forward.³⁷ For example, respect for minority rights is a core component of the accession process. In mid-October, Ukraine adopted a new law strengthening protections for minority languages that Hungary had demanded before agreeing to open two additional clusters.³⁸ (Hungary continues to hold out against opening the two remaining clusters, although it has not given a reason for doing so.) Ukraine also has to show it understands the historical sensitivities of member states and should avoid unnecessary conflicts, such as Zelensky’s dispute with Polish officials about honoring a militia that was responsible for the massacre of Polish civilians during the Second World War.³⁹ Advancing reforms and avoiding conflict with member states will ensure a more timely disbursal of EU funding and strengthen the case for more if necessary.

Defense Integration—A Bright Spot

Defense integration is one area for optimism in the EU-Ukraine relationship. Already, support for Ukraine’s defense industrial base has expanded production and literally provides more bang for the buck. Kyiv is focused on expanding joint efforts such as the Build With Ukraine program, in which the country offers its domestically developed technology and seeks to establish production lines in EU or NATO countries. Germany, Poland, the United Kingdom, and the Baltic and Nordic states are the priority targets for these efforts.⁴⁰ The EU’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) instrument, which provides €150 billion for defense investments across the EU, also supports this goal. The funding is disbursed to member states but much of it will be used for military assistance to Ukraine and, in some cases, the country can be a partner in projects and will also receive direct funding.⁴¹  

Conclusion

So far, the EU has shown the flexibility and political will to overcome some member states’ resistance and adjust its financial support for Ukraine to the increasing costs of the war and the withdrawal of most U.S. assistance. But, across Europe, the growing strength of parties hostile to Ukraine and the economic and fiscal strain of higher inflation, rising energy costs, and economies weakened by tariffs and the Iran war present new challenges. In Germany, the position of Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s coalition government is precarious, and the Alternative for Germany has portrayed financial and military assistance to Ukraine as risking war and putting foreign interests above those of the German public. In France, the election of the National Rally’s Marine Le Pen to the presidency next year would almost certainly lead to a reduction, if not end, in support for Ukraine. In this political context, Ukraine’s other political supporters in Europe will need to step up their efforts to sustain support, particularly to respond to the country’s needs over the coming winter and as the EU negotiates its next MFF. The EU institutions will also play a pivotal role, and von der Leyen’s tenure as European Commission president until 2029 will be an important element of continuity amid potential political changes at the member-state level. She will need to build coalitions with supportive member states as well as non-EU countries such as Canada, Norway, and the United Kingdom to sustain aid.

Across Europe, the growing strength of parties hostile to Ukraine and the economic and fiscal strain of higher inflation, rising energy costs, and economies weakened by tariffs and the Iran war present new challenges.

Finally, it will be essential for Europe’s political leadership to explain to the public why Ukraine matters. In Germany, for example, public opinion polling suggests that clear and unified messaging by the government about the value of military and financial support can shape public opinion. Polling also shows that overwhelming majorities across the EU see Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a threat to their own security and support continued assistance until there is a lasting and just peace.⁴² Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has been clear that bilateral irritations should not interfere with supporting Ukraine, and he has rejected calls within his country or by other European leaders to reduce military and financial assistance to Ukraine.⁴³ It is now up to national and EU leaders to make good on that sentiment and help sustain Ukraine as it fights for its existence and to avoid the devastating impact a defeat would have on the continent’s security, not to mention the EU’s international credibility.