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  "authors": [
    "Paul Schulte"
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Source: Getty

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Is NATO’s Nuclear Deterrence Policy a Relic of the Cold War?

As NATO grapples with the future of its deterrence posture, it faces the contentious question of whether reducing or withdrawing forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would unacceptably reduce the security of its member states.

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By Paul Schulte
Published on Nov 17, 2010
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Nuclear Policy

The Nuclear Policy Program aims to reduce the risk of nuclear war. Our experts diagnose acute risks stemming from technical and geopolitical developments, generate pragmatic solutions, and use our global network to advance risk-reduction policies. Our work covers deterrence, disarmament, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy.

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The Cold War left a nuclear landscape whose remnants must still be sensitively managed. As NATO grapples with the future of its deterrence posture, it faces the contentious question of whether reducing or withdrawing forward-based U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe would unacceptably reduce the security of its member states. The weapons were intended to promote nuclear burden sharing through an Alliance-wide decision process. But the European aircraft that would drop them are aging and will need replacement or refitting. Decisions are needed soon on whether this should occur.

The United States favors still greater nuclear restraint, as it declared in its recent Nuclear Posture Review. But it is reluctant to change in Europe without the agreement of all its allies. Some member states, especially on NATO’s periphery, seek the continued assurance that they believe these theater weapons offer. Other allies see the decision as an urgent opportunity to advance the goal of the abolition of nuclear weapons. So the upcoming debate in Lisbon will require a rare combination of determination, political sophistication, and analytical clarity—and issues will likely still require resolution long after the summit.

Although significant differences between member states exist, most agree NATO should:

  • Remain capable of launching a nuclear response to aggression or blackmail as long as nuclear weapons exist.
     
  • Reassure the most exposed members about the Alliance’s capacity and commitment to defend them.
     
  • Avoid a high-profile transatlantic difference of opinion, which would represent the fastest and most farreaching loss of collective credibility.
     
  • Contribute to the reduction and, when possible, the elimination of nuclear weapons in the world.

To foster lasting consensus on the future shape and basing of nuclear deterrence, NATO’s leadership must pay close attention to the internal political pressures within key member states, as well as others’ perceptions of external insecurity. Both result from long-term geographical, historical, and cultural factors. A good decision on nuclear arrangements will safeguard both the Alliance’s credibility and its cohesion—and enable NATO to focus on new and emerging threats without distraction.

About the Author

Paul Schulte

Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program

Schulte was a nonresident senior associate in the Carnegie Nuclear Policy Program, where his research focuses on the future of deterrence, nuclear strategy, nuclear nonproliferation, cybersecurity, and their political implications.

    Recent Work

  • Paper
    Looking Beyond the Chicago Summit: Nuclear Weapons in Europe and the Future of NATO
      • +2

      George Perkovich, Malcolm Chalmers, Steven Pifer, …

Paul Schulte
Former Nonresident Senior Associate, Nuclear Policy Program
Paul Schulte
Foreign PolicyNuclear PolicyGlobal GovernanceNorth AmericaUnited StatesWestern EuropeEurope

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

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