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Preface
China Local/Global
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices.
With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular.
Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Evan A. Feigenbaum
Vice President for Studies, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Introduction
Traditionally, China has considered Central Asia a relatively stable region. The security dynamics between China and the Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan evolved predominantly through formal diplomatic channels, bilateral agreements, and the institutional framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. China has collaborated with regional governments in areas such as counterterrorism, military trainings, and intelligence sharing.1 Furthermore, in international forums like the China + Central Asia Summit and the Global Security Initiative, China prioritizes security cooperation with the region in both traditional and nontraditional domains.2
Despite these close state-to-state security relations, in recent years, there has been notable growth in the presence of Chinese private security companies (PSCs) in Central Asia. Driven primarily by market demand, specifics of the local law system, and adaptation to the security challenges that Chinese enterprises face in the region, this phenomenon may also harbor the potential for the Chinese state to project power in the region should it wish to.
Origins and Evolution
Since its inception in 2000 by the Chinese government, the “Go Out” policy has actively encouraged Chinese state-owned enterprises to broaden their operations overseas and consequently to increase the deployment of their staff abroad. This has been accompanied by a notable rise in attacks on Chinese nationals in politically volatile regions, including the tragic deaths of eleven Chinese road engineers in 2004 in Afghanistan, an assault on three Chinese workers in Pakistan in 2007, kidnappings of Chinese workers in Sudan and Egypt in 2012, and other similar incidents.3
The growth and expansion of Chinese PSCs overseas may have been a natural response to these processes. The mid-2000s saw an emergence of professional private contractors offering their services, including armed protection for Chinese state-owned entities operating abroad. As of 2018, more than 8,200 Chinese PSCs were registered, collectively employing nearly 5 million people, and more than thirty of these companies were operating outside of China’s borders, mostly in Africa and Southeast Asia.4
As China’s investments in Central Asia have increased, Chinese companies have encountered unforeseen security challenges. In several cases, left without the support of local security forces, Chinese companies have found themselves vulnerable. Incidents such as the clashes between Chinese and Kyrgyz personnel at oil refineries and gold mines in Kyrgyzstan in 2014 and 2019, the 2016 suicide bombing at the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, and numerous anti-China protests in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan underscore these challenges, which have prompted a turn toward hiring Chinese PSCs.5
A 2020 report from the Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs identified at least six Chinese PSCs operating in the region, offering a diverse array of services encompassing both armed and unarmed site protection, security consulting, safety training, insurance provision, and logistical support.6 Since the publication of the report, some contractors have closed their offices in the region or begun providing their services only on fixed-term contracts.
Determining the presence or absence of Chinese PSCs in the region is challenging because of the potential confusion between these entities and other Chinese companies. PSCs’ activities in Central Asia are often similar to those of companies in other industries that provide some security-related services, like Beijing Huaxun Weida Communication Electronic Technology, a telecommunications firm that also offers security monitoring equipment to oil fields.7
Local Specifics
In recent years, China’s strategic approach to security in Central Asia has shifted to address nontraditional security threats in the region, which require specialized responses beyond the capabilities of conventional military forces. In general, the business approaches of Chinese security contractors in Central Asia, while adhering to local legal structures, hint at a market-driven impetus rather than direct influence from the Chinese state. However, this analysis relies solely on publicly available information and may not reflect other possible motivations of these contractors.
Kyrgyzstan
Kyrgyzstan stands out for its high number of incidents involving Chinese workers and anti-China protests, which has created a demand from Chinese companies in the country for security services. Moreover, Kyrgyz law permits the employment of foreign PSCs (unlike that of some other countries in the region).8 These two factors likely contribute to the high level of activity by Chinese security contractors within Kyrgyz borders.
Established and managed by former officers in the Chinese military and government, Zhongjun Junhong Group (中军军弘集团)9 and China Security and Protection Group (中安保实业集团有限公司)10 have opened branches in Kyrgyzstan. Reports indicate that in 2016, Zhongjun Junhong Group collaborated with a Kyrgyz PSC to establish Haiwei Security Service, which obtained a gun license from the Kyrgyz state, enabling the partnership to provide armed protection services.11 Similarly, in 2017, China Security and Protection Group acquired a local Kyrgyz PSC and established Security Associated,12 which offers a wide range of security services including armed protection, security guard training, K9 units, and digital security.13 Notably, the company boasts a quick response team for instances involving “physical threats, traffic accidents, and problems with local authorities.”14 Both Haiwei Security Service and Security Associated work in close cooperation with local law enforcement and possess significant inventories of vehicles and security equipment.
Kazakhstan
In Kazakhstan, growing anti-China sentiments and political unrest in January 2022—which resulted in over 200 casualties15 (though no Chinese nationals or assets were harmed)—may have created a demand among Chinese enterprises for additional security services. However, Kazakh law prohibits the operation of foreign private security firms or those with foreign involvement within the country’s borders.16
As a result, the activities of Chinese PSCs in the country are restricted to services other than direct security provision. For example, in 2018, Chinese security company Frontier Services Group (FSG) opened an office in Almaty and provided air transportation and emergency rescue for BRI projects through the Maleth Aero air logistics company.17 FSG sold its shares of Maleth Aero in December 2020, and as of 2021, FSG’s operational presence in the country was limited to delivering online safety training courses on the security situation in Kazakhstan for more than thirty Chinese companies based in the country.18
Other Chinese PSCs have also tried to enter the Kazakh market. In 2018, China Shield Security Group (华盾安保集团) entered into a strategic cooperation framework agreement with Kazakh PSC Kuzet to jointly carry out security operations around the BRI and production capacity projects in Kazakhstan.19 Following this, in September 2023, the Chinese company HXZA (华信中安) inked a memorandum of cooperation with Kazakh PSC KMG-Security, a subsidiary of the Kazakh state-owned oil and gas enterprise KazMunayGas, which is responsible for safeguarding the Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline.20 The agreement entails collaborative efforts in securing primary pipelines and critical infrastructures in Kazakhstan against security risks and acts of terrorism, with prospective plans for executing a mutual pilot project.21 It is plausible that HXZA was commissioned by the Chinese state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation, which holds a 50 percent stake in the pipeline.
Uzbekistan
The legislation of Uzbekistan pertaining to security services exclusively authorizes national law enforcement agencies to deliver such services, explicitly prohibiting the operation of private security enterprises in any capacity.22 This presents significant hurdles to Chinese PSCs in the country. While there have been some indications of operations by the China Security Technology Group (中国安保技术集团), its services are constrained to insurance offerings facilitated through a third-party arrangement.23
At present, there exists no substantiated indication of demand for Chinese PSCs to provide training or logistical assistance. This may be attributable to the absence of any notable anti-China sentiment or protest movements in Uzbekistan and the resulting relatively secure environment for Chinese enterprises in the country.
Turkmenistan and Tajikistan
Lack of demand may also explain the absence of Chinese contractors in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan. Despite both nations boasting a thriving domestic private security market, they do not have laws regulating the operation of foreign PSCs on their soil. However, perhaps because of the relative stability prevailing in Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, Chinese enterprises have primarily engaged local PSCs for their security needs. Only twenty-two Chinese companies operate in Turkmenistan, and there is little evidence that any of them provide security services.24 But Chinese security contractors have begun to show interest in entering the Tajik market. For instance, China Shield Security Group, through its subsidiary Three Lions International (三狮国际), recently formed a strategic partnership with Tajik PSC Red Line.25
Despite these efforts, however, Tajikistan still remains largely unexplored by Chinese PSCs. The absence of demand for Chinese security from Chinese companies in Tajikistan could be due to the presence of China’s People’s Armed Police (PAP) at paramilitary installations in the country, which may also help to protect Chinese investments.26
Strategic Implications
The official standpoint of the Chinese government underscores the critical importance of protecting Beijing’s overseas interests. Chinese President Xi Jinping has explicitly stated that the protection of China’s interests abroad is a fundamental element of the nation’s economic advancement and national security.27 Moreover, this idea has been repeatedly highlighted in China’s recent security documents, including the 2015 National Security Law, the 2019 Defense Strategy White Paper, and the 2022 Global Security Initiative.28
However, China’s noninterference policy restricts Beijing’s options for intervening in the domestic affairs of foreign states or deploying conventional troops. Chinese security contractors’ growing interest in Central Asia may also stem from Beijing’s strategic security concerns within the region. These firms provide Beijing with a means to undertake actions that might otherwise conflict with its publicly stated policy of noninterference and its commitment to a “peaceful rise.”29
In 2009, the Chinese government adopted the Regulation on the Administration of Security and Guarding Services, which legalized state ownership of Chinese PSCs providing armed protection.30 Moreover, the 2018 Regulations on the Safety Management for Overseas Chinese-funded Enterprises, Institutions, and Personnel placed Chinese contractors under the Ministry of Public Security (MPS) within the framework of the Belt and Road Integrated National Security Intelligence System (一带一路国家安全情报融合制度体系) for gathering and sharing of intelligence concerning the security landscape in host countries.31 Given the MPS’s leading role in China’s current police/paramilitary cooperation strategy in Central Asia, PSCs (like the PAP) may serve as a mechanism for protecting China’s interests.
Furthermore, while China’s current intelligence strategy in Central Asia prioritizes receiving information through cooperation channels with local state security agencies, it also uses human intelligence run by China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS), which recruits local assets to covertly gather intelligence for compensation rather than deploying MSS operatives, offering a discreet and potentially less risky approach to obtaining valuable information. A notable example is Konstantin Syroezhkin, a former KGB agent and top China expert at the state-affiliated Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, who was allegedly convicted of espionage for China in 2019 and was recently released on parole.32
However, some experts argue that the 2022 protests in Kazakhstan revealed “China’s poor understanding of the region” and “lack of necessary intelligence,” suggesting that the Chinese use of primarily local intelligence assets in the country has been ineffective.33 The experience may have highlighted for Beijing the risks China could encounter in other Central Asian nations as a result of this lack of “boots on the ground,” which could encourage Beijing to consider a more direct approach to intelligence gathering. The Wall Street Journal has reported that Chinese authorities have attempted to persuade Kazakh leaders to permit the deployment of Chinese PSCs within the country.34
Furthermore, the potential plausible deniability of private contractors may serve as an attractive instrument for Beijing to exert political influence. For instance, across Southeast Asia, Chinese PSCs are engaged in safeguarding BRI projects, training local troops, and building military infrastructure for host countries.35 These strategic endeavors cannot be solely attributed to market forces and likely required direct approval from Beijing. If circumstances require or allow, Beijing could potentially deploy contractors in Central Asian states in a similar manner.
Conclusion
The evolution of Chinese PSCs, spurred by the “Go Out” policy and the BRI, has demonstrated their adaptation to market demands and security challenges faced by Chinese enterprises operating abroad. Their operational scope in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan conforms to local legal regulations and to demand from Chinese enterprises. Conversely, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan lack demand for Chinese security but offer potential opportunities for Chinese PSCs because of the absence of legal constraints. In Uzbekistan, limited demand and strict legal conditions limit their presence.
At the same time, the presence of Chinese private security businesses in Central Asia reflects China’s multifaceted strategic approach to countering nontraditional security threats. It aligns with China’s modern security diplomacy, police/paramilitary cooperation, and recently adopted Global Security Initiative. From this perspective, these entities potentially present an attractive instrument for advancing Beijing’s geopolitical agenda. As China’s influence in the region continues to grow, the role of these silent sentinels will remain a critical aspect of regional dynamics.
Acknowledgments
The opinions, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this publication are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Institute of Advanced International Studies, or Southern Illinois University. The author wishes to extend sincere gratitude to the team at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for their invaluable editorial assistance.
Notes
1“Background and Mission,” Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, accessed July 23, 2024, https://ecrats.org/en/about/history/.
2“Working Together for a China-Central Asia Community With a Shared Future Featuring Mutual Assistance, Common Development, Universal Security, and Everlasting Friendship,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, May 19, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/202305/t20230519_11079941.html; and “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html
3Carlotta Gall, “Taliban Suspected in Killing of 11 Chinese Workers,” New York Times, June 11, 2004, https://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/11/world/taliban-suspected-in-killing-of-11-chinese-workers.html; “Gunmen Kill Three Chinese Workers in Pakistan,” Reuters, August 8, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSISL273531/; and Peter Ford, “Why Chinese Workers Are Getting Kidnapped Abroad,” Christian Science Monitor, February 1, 2012, https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2012/0201/Why-Chinese-workers-are-getting-kidnapped-abroad.
4Cheng Xizhong, “Overseas Security Must Keep Up With the Pace of ‘Belt and Road’ Construction,” Charhar Institute, July 18, 2018, http://www.charhar.org.cn/uploads/file/20180718/20180718110654_5155.pdf.
5Chris Rickleton, “Kyrgyzstan: Chinese Workers Deported After Riot at Strategic Refinery,” EurasiaNet, July 3, 2014, https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-chinese-workers-deported-after-riot-at-strategic-refinery; RFE/RL’s Kyrgyz Service, “Dozens Injured as Locals Clash With Chinese Mining Company Workers in Kyrgyzstan,” August 6, 2019, https://www.rferl.org/a/dozens-injured-as-locals-clash-with-chinese-mining-company-workers-in-kyrgyzstan/30094924.html; Tom Phillips, “Suicide Bomber Attacks Chinese Embassy in Kyrgyzstan,” Guardian, August 30, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/30/bomb-attack-chinese-embassy-kyrgyzstan-bishkek; Isabelle DeSisto, “Competing for Cake Crumbs: Why Chinese Mining Leads to Conflict in Kyrgyzstan but Not Tajikistan,” Central Asia Program, https://centralasiaprogram.org/competing-cake-crumbs-chinese-mining-leads-conflict-kyrgyzstan-tajikistan/; and Abdujalil Abdurasulov, “Kazakhstan’s Land Reform Protests Explained,” BBC News, April 28, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-36163103.
6Niva Yau and Dirk van der Kley, “The Growth, Adaptation and Limitations of Chinese Private Security Companies in Central Asia,” Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs, October 13, 2020, https://oxussociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/the-growth-adaptation-and-limitations-of-chinese-private-security-companies-in-central-asia.pdf.
7“Huaxun Weida,” Beijing Huaxun Weida Communication Electronic Technology Co., Ltd., archived July 8, 2013, at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20130708183836/http://www.huaxun.com/cn/about.aspx?faid=147.
8“On Private Detective and Security Activity in the Kyrgyz Republic,” Law of the Kyrgyz Republic, July 1, 1996, https://cbd.minjust.gov.kg/642/edition/1220536/ru.
9“About Us,” Zhongjun Junhong Group, archived June 9, 2023, at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20230609060705/http://www.osgjh.com/en/about/15.html.
10“Overseas Security Department,” China Security & Protection Group Co., Ltd., accessed July 15, 2024, http://www.cspbj.com.cn/OurService/index/385.
11Martina Mengye, “中国民营安保公司在吉国’落地生根 [Chinese Private Security Companies Taking Root in Kyrgyzstan],” Silk Road New Observation, August 17, 2016, http://2016cn.siluxgc.com/html/C1413/201608/531466397323047992.shtml.
12Yu Wanli and Jiang Qianlu, “全球安保行业的发展状况与业态特征 [Global Security Industry Development Status and Format Features],” Public Diplomacy Quarterly, 2019, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_4158256.
13The company’s website doesn’t provide details of trainings, but mentions training of nonstate security service employees. It also provides a photo of the company’s license for teaching this course. “Certified Training of Employees,” Security Associated, accessed July 23, 2024, http://www.securitykg.com/index.php/services/9-services2.
14“24/7 Rapid Response Team,” Security Associated, accessed July 16, 2024, http://www.securitykg.com/index.php/services/13-services6.
15“Kazakhstan Authorities Raise Death Toll From Unrest to 225,” Guardian, January 16, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/16/kazakhstan-authorities-raise-death-toll-from-unrest-to-225.
16“On Security Activities,” Law of the Republic of Kazakhstan, October 19, 2000, https://online.zakon.kz/Document/?doc_id=1020355&pos=5;-106#pos=5;-106.
17“Frontier Services Group Gives Keynote Speech at the First ‘Belt and Road’ Medical Rescue Conference,” Frontier Services Group, August 31, 2018, http://www.fsgroup.com/en/news/show-420.html.
18“2022 Annual Report,” Frontier Services Group, 2022, https://doc.irasia.com/listco/hk/frontier/annual/2022/ar2022.pdf; and “先丰为驻哈萨克斯坦中资企业开展安全培训 [FSG Conducts Security Training for Chinese Enterprises in Kazakhstan],” Frontier Services Group, February 26, 2021, http://www.fsgroup.com/news/show-604.html.
19Liu Wenbin, "中安华盾与哈萨克斯坦库捷特安保公司签署战略合作框架协议 [China Shield Signs Strategic Cooperation Framework Agreement with Kazakhstan Kuzet Security Company],” July 16, 2018, Zhongan Huadun, https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/KakoT6zEDoUcvFBJoGWlMA.
20“Новый формат международного сотрудничества [New Format of International Cooperation],” KMG Security, October 2, 2023, https://www.kmg-s.kz/rus/novosti/?cid=0&rid=236.
21“ТОО «KMG-Security» и охранная компания «HXZA» (КНР) готовы развивать сотрудничество [‘KMG-Security LLP’ and Security Company ‘HXZA’ (PRC) Are Ready to Develop Cooperation],” KMG-Security, November 10, 2023, https://www.kmg-s.kz/rus/novosti/?cid=0&rid=244.
22“On Security Activities,” Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan, April 28, 2022, https://lex.uz/ru/docs/6066686.
23Yau and van der Kley, “Growth, Adaptation, and Limitations”; “保险服务[Insurance Services],” China Security Technology Group, archived September 28, 2023, at the Wayback Machine, https://web.archive.org/web/20230928010853/http://cstghk.com/Insurance.html.
24“土库曼斯坦中资企业 [Chinese Enterprises in Turkmenistan],” Huanenet, June 6, 2023, https://www.huanenet.com/tkmst/1836.html.
25Three Lions International, "华盾集团密集开展’安保外交’，精准发力海外市场 [China Shield Security Group Intensively Engages in ‘Security Diplomacy,’ Precisely Targeting Overseas Markets],” October 30, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1781157564040968982&wfr=spider&for=pc; and "塔吉克斯坦“红线集团”总经理沙拉夫·哈比博夫先生访问华盾集团 [Mr. Sharif Habibov, General Manager of Tajikistan’s ‘Red Line Group,’ Visits Huadun Group],” October 27, 2023, https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1780888024825584151&wfr=spider&for=pc.
26Jennifer Murtazashvili, "China’s Activities and Influence in South and Central Asia," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 17, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/17/china-s-activities-and-influence-in-south-and-central-asia-pub-87146.
27“Xi Jinping Presided Over the First Meeting of the 19th Central National Security Committee and Delivered an Emportant Speech,” Xinhua News, April 17, 2018, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2018-04/17/content_5283445.htm.
28“National Security Law,” National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 2015, https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2015-07/01/content_2893902.htm; “China’s National Defense in the New Era,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, July 24, 2019, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/Publications/WhitePapers/4846452.html; and “The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, February 21, 2023, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html.
29“Full Text: China’s National Defense in the New Era,” State Council of the People’s Republic of China, last updated July 24, 2019, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html.
30”Regulation on the Administration of Security and Guarding Services,” Order No. 564, State Council of the People’s Republic of China, “ 2009, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2009-10/19/content_1443395.htm.
31”Regulations on the Safety Management for Overseas Chinese-funded Enterprises, Institutions, and Personnel,” Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, 2018, http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/201803/20180323112639296.pdf.
32Thomas Grove, “A Spy Case Exposes China’s Power Play in Central Asia,” Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-spy-case-exposes-chinas-power-play-in-central-asia-11562756782; and RFE/RL's Kazakh Service, “Leading Kazakh Sinologist Jailed on Treason Charge Released on Parole,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, April 5, 2024, https://www.rferl.org/a/kazakhstan-syroyezhkin-treason-parole/32892748.html.
33Igor Denisov, “After Kazakhstan Crisis, China Will Reassess Its Influence in Central Asia,” Diplomat, January 18, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/after-kazakhstan-crisis-china-will-reassess-its-influence-in-central-asia/; and Benno Zogg, “Observer Now, Beneficiary Later: China and the Unrest in Kazakhstan,” Diplomat, January 21, 2022, https://thediplomat.com/2022/01/observer-now-beneficiary-later-china-and-the-unrest-in-kazakhstan/.
34Grove, “A Spy Case Exposes China’s Power Play.”
35“美好生活水平号, "多年来 中军军弘海上护航 陆上守点 维护国家海外利益安全 [For Years, Zhongjun Junhong Has Safeguarded National Overseas Interests Through Maritime Escort and Land-based Security Points],” NetEase, October 24, 2023, https://www.163.com/dy/article/IHQDBGIC0553C0A6.html; "以演筑防，以练备战——中老铁路安全事件应急演练" [Building Defense Through Rehearsals, Preparing for Battle—Emergency Drill for Security Incidents on the China-Laos Railway],” Frontier Services Group, September 28, 2022, http://www.fsgroup.com/news/show-739.html; and “老挝空军领导视察总部办公大楼项目 [Leaders of the Lao Air Force Inspected the Headquarters Office Building Project],” Frontier Services Group, October 11, 2021, http://www.fsgroup.com/news/show-685.html.
