A Sustainable Nuclear Future Requires Transparent Regulation

U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration is seeking to speed deployment of advanced nuclear reactor technologies by avoiding the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) public and transparent licensing process. By doing so, the administration may be working against its own long-term goals by short-circuiting the public arbitration process moderated by the NRC that is critical to building and maintaining public acceptance and confidence in nuclear energy.

Existing Authorities

On May 23, 2025, Trump signed four executive orders (EO) intended to accelerate deployment of nuclear power in the United States. EO 14299, “Deploying Advanced Nuclear Reactor Technologies for National Security,” specifically directs the secretaries of defense and energy to establish programs to deploy advanced reactors at government installations for power production or to power artificial intelligence data centers. Further, the EO directs both the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE) to approve the construction and operation of these reactors under their respective authorities under the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). Additionally, under EO 14301, “Reforming Nuclear Reactor Testing at the Department of Energy,” DOE is directed to streamline its own reactor approvals and environmental reviews.

Both DOD and DOE have approved and operated reactors over many decades for their own purposes, including basic research, technology demonstration, and fissile material and isotope production. Notably, the U.S. Navy has operated onboard reactors safely since the first nuclear-powered submarine, the USS Nautilus, was put to sea in 1954.

The AEA authorizes such approvals for DOD, as long as the reactor is primarily for military or national security purposes and any connection to the commercial grid is incidental. DOE has similar authorities, allowing the agency to operate reactors for its own programs, but, significantly, not to demonstrate commercial suitability or operate as a commercial power program. Examples of DOE building and operating reactors for its own programs include the nine reactors at the Hanford Site in Washington State that supplied the nation’s nuclear weapons complex with fissile material and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II fast reactor at Idaho National Laboratory. Outside of these boundaries—that is, for commercial, power production purposes—a license from the NRC is required to build and operate a nuclear reactor in the United States. The executive order does not change the fundamental authorities or strictures of the Atomic Energy Act; rather, it directs both DOD and DOE to act within existing authorities to deploy advanced reactor technology expeditiously.

Fundamentals of Nuclear Regulation

Safety of nuclear fission reactors is about three key issues: controlling reactivity, removing heat, and containing potential leakages (isolating radioactivity from people and the environment). Every reactor technology in both conceptual and practical terms includes tradeoffs among these three factors.

When evaluating the safety of any reactor design, the NRC has historically asked three basic questions: What could go wrong (for example, design basis events and failure modes)? What are the systems, structures, and components or operational modes that either prevent things from going wrong or mitigate the consequences of things going wrong? And what are the methodologies, data, and models that support the answers to these questions?

Reactor developers seeking DOE approval will be expected to demonstrate safety in similar terms. Current DOE regulations are codified by Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Parts 830 (Nuclear Safety Program) and 851 (Worker Safety and Health Program), along with the Policy documents and Orders that implement them. Examples of implementing policies and orders include Policy 420.1, “Nuclear Energy Safety Policy,” and its accompanying Order 420.1C, which requires DOE “to design, construct, operate, and decommission its nuclear facilities in a manner that ensures adequate protection of workers, the public, and the environment.” Others include orders implementing requirements for quality assurance (Order 414.1E), radioactive waste management (Order 435.1), integrated safety management (Order 450.2), and radiation protection of the public and the environment (Order 458.1).

Implicit in the effort to approve novel reactor technologies at DOE and DOD facilities is the assumption that the process will be faster and easier for reactor developers. But if DOE matches NRC’s rigor, it’s not clear why that should be the case. And if the analysis is less rigorous, what is the rationale for that approach and why should the public trust that process, especially for companies that have already seemingly struggled to meet NRC’s straightforward requirements?

If the goal is broad commercial deployment as the administration has averred, then creating a gap between DOE/DOD and the NRC from the start on risk tolerance seems short-sighted.

Additionally, while DOE and DOD methods for reactor approval may be similar to the NRC, their risk tolerances and protection standards have not been subject to the same level of public scrutiny, debate, and comment. Every policy, regulation, and guidance document at the NRC is made available for public comment and is voted on by the commission. While public opinions may exist in a range, what the NRC considers an “acceptable risk” for human health and safety is clear for everyone. Given a long history of using a “decide-announce-defend” approach, the same cannot be obviously concluded for DOE and DOD. Therefore, even before the first confirmatory analysis is conducted, both agencies are operating from a deficit of trust and legitimacy. While not ideal, that might be somewhat understandable if the goal is national security. However, if the goal is broad commercial deployment as the administration has averred, then creating a gap between DOE/DOD and the NRC from the start on risk tolerance seems short-sighted.

To be clear, in order for the broad-scale nuclear deployment that the administration envisions, technology and project developers will need a license from the NRC for anything that operates outside of a DOD or DOE site. And in order to grant that license, the NRC staff will need to make a determination that the project, when constructed and operated within NRC standards, provides reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health and safety and the environment. The information provided to DOE or DOD may be sufficient for such a determination; or it may not.

Because the Atomic Energy Act requires that the NRC make its own determination regarding adequate protection of public health and safety, it remains incumbent on the NRC staff to ensure that the agency’s own requirements have been met before a technology is commercially deployed. If applicants have submitted a robust proposal and DOE subjects it to a commensurate level of scrutiny as the NRC would do, then applicants may have an easy path to approval for commercial deployment. However, that will ultimately be for the NRC to decide.

Public Trust is Key

If DOE requirements are similar to those of the NRC, then it is reasonable to ask what is lost with DOE (or DOD) reactor approvals? Unquestionably, transparency. NRC conducts all of its licensing activities in the open, making technical documents and meetings with applicants and licensees available to the public, with appropriate exceptions for business-sensitive information. DOE has no such requirements and historically has been averse to the kind of openness necessary to cultivate public trust.¹

If DOE requirements are similar to those of the NRC, then it is reasonable to ask what is lost with DOE (or DOD) reactor approvals? Unquestionably, transparency.

This suggests the need to consider whether DOE’s processes are sufficient for broader public purposes. Not only does the NRC conduct its reviews in full public view, it has specific processes—codified in regulation—that allow the public to challenge NRC’s safety and environmental conclusions. By subjecting itself to internal and external scrutiny—a key tenet of nuclear safety culture—the NRC enables the kind of open arbitration of nuclear technology and its applications that is critical to public confidence.

Last month, DOE and NRC signed an addendum to their umbrella memorandum of understanding for the purpose of coordinating “DOE and NRC technical readiness and sharing of technical expertise and knowledge on advanced nuclear reactor technologies and nuclear energy innovation, including reactor concepts demonstrations.” Drawing on each agency’s expertise for approving the demonstration projects DOE is pursuing is a good thing, as it draws on a long history of collaboration on both existing and new technologies.

However, several questions remain. If initial approval is sought and gained through DOE, how much of the applicant’s technical work and how much of DOE’s evaluation of that work will be available to the public? Will it be available through the NRC during the process for commercial deployment approval? Will the public have the opportunity to challenge DOE’s conclusions through the NRC process or only the NRC’s findings on requirements specific to NRC regulations? It’s incumbent on both DOE and NRC to answer these questions in such a way that increases transparency and public confidence.

To build and maintain public trust that the department’s activities are safe for workers and the public, DOE should clearly and transparently show it is validating, through rigorous confirmatory analysis, a reactor vendor’s answers to the three key safety questions (and their derivatives) mentioned above. Further, DOE should institute a public consultation/comment process, where both the vendor and DOE present their analytical work and subject it to public scrutiny. And finally, DOE must show how its radiation protection standards have direct analogues to those used by NRC. Without a firm commitment to rigorous safety analyses and thorough transparency, DOE may face real, and justifiable, opposition from the public and their elected officials.

Looking Beyond the Domestic Market

The transparency of NRC’s processes is critical not only for domestic deployment. It is similarly crucial for meeting the administration’s goals for exporting U.S. technology. Executive Order 14299 includes direction on “Promoting American Nuclear Exports” (Section 8). In it, the secretary of state is directed to “fully leverage the resources of the Federal Government to promote United States nuclear industry in the development of commercial civil nuclear projects globally.”

Yet, a key part of America’s success internationally relies not only on the reputation of NRC’s technical staff and the detailed reviews it conducts, but also on the transparency of those reviews and the accessibility of NRC’s online document management system, ADAMS. These are among the main reasons the NRC is viewed internationally as the gold standard of nuclear safety regulation, and why regulators of many other countries seek partnerships with the NRC.

A key part of America’s success internationally relies not only on the reputation of NRC’s technical staff and the detailed reviews it conducts, but also on the transparency of those reviews.

Additionally important is the availability of NRC staff to share insights about how and why licensing decisions are made through both formal, signed agreements as well as through informal, ad hoc discussions. In aggregate, the NRC gives U.S. technology a significant advantage in the global market, even when other countries offer more attractive financial terms, as is often the case. Hence, when the public record is less robust and when NRC’s role appears to be diminished in the evaluation of new technologies, the United States may suffer an avoidable, potential disadvantage in global markets.  

Protecting the NRC’s Independent Voice

The demand for all kinds of energy is increasing: affordable, clean, reliable energy to power the U.S. economy in the decades ahead. Nuclear is a viable option that meets all these needs. Indeed, today’s drive to expand nuclear power echoes that of the 1970s, with the need for greater energy self-sufficiency to drive a thriving economy in the face of threats of supply constraints. Therefore, it is worth remembering how former president Gerald R. Ford faced that moment.

In October 1974, he signed the Energy Reorganization Act, formally dissolving the Atomic Energy Commission and separating the federal government’s promotional and regulatory functions for nuclear power. In signing the act, Ford said of the NRC, “The establishment of this new independent regulatory commission will maximize regulatory objectivity and impartiality, thereby increasing public confidence in nuclear regulations. NRC will enhance the orderly development of the nuclear industry and at the same time assure protection of the public health and safety in civilian nuclear activities.” And when the law went into effect on January 15, 1975, Ford said, “The creation of the NRC should end the concern that some have expressed about the past when one agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, was assigned the responsibility for both the technological development and the regulation of civilian nuclear power.” 

The NRC can and should be more efficient. Significant progress has been made in that area, helped in no small part by the strongly bipartisan passage of the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy (ADVANCE) Act in 2024. Even so, the NRC’s technical credibility and deep focus on safety provides nuclear power with an essential social license—tacit permission from the public that nuclear power is safe. Congress and the president had the wisdom to fully separate the promotional and regulatory missions of the Atomic Energy Commission in 1974, resulting in a remarkable track record of nuclear safety and increasing performance in the United States. Indeed, public support for nuclear power has never been higher. Eroding the separation of functions that has served the public and the nuclear industry so well threatens to undo that record and the public confidence it has so rightly engendered.