Reframing the U.S. Role in a New Nuclear Renaissance: Ensuring Flexibility in Fuel Procurement as a Counter to FEOC Influence

The West has a mixed track record when it comes to industrial policy for clean energy. From the recent walk back of Inflation Reduction Act incentives in the United States to the collapse of Europe’s state-backed battery producer Northvolt, the last decade of public-private coordination on energy and industrial supply chains has yielded partial successes and false starts. Meanwhile, China’s state-led strategy to dominate virtually every low-carbon supply chain has consolidated control of the energy technologies of the future in Beijing’s sphere of influence.

And yet, the risks posed by reliance on Chinese clean technology exports are not consistent between products. Cheap and abundant polysilicon solar modules or wind turbine nacelles are a global good regardless of origin, and the associated manufacturing bases are dependent on foreign markets, due to overproduction and low margines in the domestic Chinese market. Reliance on Chinese battery cells or grid transformers presents a greater degree of risk, given their critical role across core economic sectors and the potential for component sabotage. Industrial policy should prioritize diversifying the supply of clean energy technologies with the greatest economic and security risks associated with entities of concern (FEOC).

The nuclear energy supply chain sits atop the clean technology risk pyramid. Beyond standard supply chain considerations, nuclear exports are subject to a suite of safety and security concerns, and overreliance on a single technology or fuel provider can create significant dependencies given the limited number of suppliers and distinct intellectual property (IP). While the United States maintains the largest fleet of legacy nuclear reactors, Russia and China account for the vast majority of planned new builds, particularly in emerging markets. U.S. and allied nuclear technology providers face an array of challenges when competing with Russian or Chinese developers abroad, a dynamic that will likely linger over the next decade, but the greatest leverage in the nuclear energy supply chain has less to do with reactor designs and more with the fuel they require.

As U.S.-designated FEOC deploy new reactor models abroad, the United States and European allies should prepare clear-eyed and creative counters by focusing on fuel. For countries planning new Russian or Chinese reactors, the greatest long-term vulnerability arises from sole dependence on Russian or Chinese fuel assemblies, given their unique technical specifications. Without a viable alternative assembly supplier, Russia and China will enjoy significant coercive leverage over energy markets of the future.

Fortunately, a playbook dating back nearly three decades could be adapted to meet the moment. In the 1990s, the European nuclear community (Euratom), North American corporations, and Eastern European reactor operators began a collaborative process for developing the technical capacity to produce alternative fuel reloads for Russian VVER reactors common across former Soviet states. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, as Europe struggled to withdraw from Russian pipeline gas, alternative Western nuclear providers were prepared to provide emergency reloads to VVER models across Eastern Europe thanks to long-term industrial policy initiated three decades prior.

Nuclear capacity expansions over the next decade, however, will not be confined to a single region or reactor family. In addition to new Russian deployments, China’s nuclear industry is poised to export largely indigenous technology. To preempt the risks associated with increasing global reliance on Russian and Chinese fuel assembly reloads, the United States should work with its European and East Asian allies to develop the technical ability to fabricate alternative fuel assemblies for FEOC reactors. If early-stage R&D actions are not taken soon, the United States will be granting China and Russia significant leverage over countries that choose to embrace their nuclear technology.

The costs to scale up the front-end fuel production capacity needed to supply all new Russian and Chinese reactors is objectively prohibitive. However, maintaining the IP and technical knowledge to fabricate a limited number of fuel assemblies for Russian- and Chinese-made reactors is a prudent investment. Maintaining a technical knowledge of FEOC fuel assembly specifications would give the West a strategic option to scale up that capacity, reducing the coercive leverage of FEOCs in the event of a crisis, as opposed to having to develop the capacity from scratch.

What’s at Stake?

If the world is in fact on the verge of a new nuclear renaissance, its architects will bring a dynamism that Western incumbents will struggle to match. Together, Rosatom and its Chinese counterparts account for over 60 gigawatts of on-order nuclear reactors. While a majority of this capacity will supply Russian and Chinese domestic load growth, a significant share of Russia’s new builds are planned in foreign markets, and China is shoring up its export strategy.

As Russian and Chinese firms ink deals and break ground, the United States and G7 partners are leaning into diplomatic leadership for new nuclear energy. Launched at COP28, the flagship “Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy” sets an ambitious target for its signatories but lacks clear direction for intergovernmental coordination or available financing. The pledge—which has expanded to include thirty-one countries, fourteen financial institutions, tech sector demand giants, and a consortium of nuclear suppliers—does little more than position Western nuclear incumbents as patrons of the renaissance, rather than its core producers.

The composition of parties to the tripling pledge demonstrates both the global demand for nuclear energy, as well as the constraints on U.S. leadership. Its sovereign membership includes several “new nuclear” states (those aiming for their first reactors) such as: El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Kosovo, and Nigeria. Bound by justifiably strict export regulations and a suite of commercial constraints, U.S. vendors are currently unable to export nuclear technology—reactors, components, enriched fuels—to nine of the thirty-one countries under the pledge. Ultimately, the coalition of allied financial institutions and nuclear firms participating in the pledge are free to encourage nuclear newcomers but are constrained in their ability to operate in new markets, complicating efforts to lead on developing new capacity.

Even the more concrete programs encouraging investments in fuel enrichment and reactor construction limit their membership to close allies. The Sapporo 5—that is, Canada, France, Japan, the United Kingdom, and United States—collectively account for over 50 percent of global enrichment and conversion capacity. The group announced plans to increase investment to expand enrichment capacities, but it did not spell out where the promised $4.2 billion will come from to grow Western enrichment and conversion capacity. Moreover, the pledged spending by the Sapporo 5 pales in comparison to what would be required to meet global targets for new nuclear builds.

Other State Department outreach strategies for nuclear energy—including the Foundational Infrastructure for the Responsible Use of Small Modular Reactor Technology (FIRST) program and Project Phoenix, its Eastern European offshoot—represent strong early diplomatic overtures to engage current and potential civilian nuclear energy partners, but financing barriers have significantly slowed progress. The Winning an Edge through Cooperation in Advanced Nuclear (WECAN) alliance, co-chaired with Japan, also aims to bring new nuclear states into the fold, but its status under the new U.S. administration is uncertain (Ghana’s WECAN cooperation agreement is no longer available on the State Department’s webpage).

Russia’s Reactor Renaissance-Man Routine

Russia’s Rosatom and its subsidiaries TVEL and Atomstroyexport are spearheading outreach to nuclear newcomers, with forays into twenty-nine emerging markets. Twenty-five Russian VVER reactors are scheduled for grid connection before 2030, more than half of which are distributed across India, Bangladesh, Egypt, Türkiye, and Slovakia. Russia has codified nuclear relationships with fifty-four countries through memorandums of understanding, joint research collaborations, technology export deals, project construction contracts, and fuel supply agreements. Degrees of dependence on Russian designs vary—with the greatest exposure from Iran and Belarus—but at least twenty countries are categorized as having a “high” or “medium” level of cooperation with Russian firms, including India, Egypt, Türkiye, Spain, Finland, Sweden, and Kenya, according to research from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs.

Rosatom’s foreign engagement model is underwritten by persistent state-backing. Overseas Russian reactor deals are in part guaranteed by the full faith and credit of the Kremlin, enabling Rosatom’s inflated risk appetite and extraordinary project costs. Twin VVER-1200 reactors under construction in Bangladesh are expected to cost upward of $12.6 billion, of which reportedly 90 percent is financed by the Russian government with capped interest rates. State funds are also contributing $25 billion in favorable financing for four VVER-1200 models at Egypt’s El Dabaa facility.

Rosatom’s prime appeal, particularly for new nuclear states, is its ability to function as a “one-stop-shop,” building reactors, supply fuels, and even removing spent materials. The one-stop model was refined between 2009 and 2018, when Russian firms were responsible for twenty-three of the thirty-one reactors under construction worldwide while competitors reeled from global backlash to the Fukushima disaster. Russian customers continue to benefit from trusted “reactor construction know-how, training, support related to safety, non-proliferation regime requirements and flexible financing options, including government-sourced credit lines.”

Made in China: Domestic New Builds and International Intentions

China is preparing to replicate Russia’s success. In 2019, Chinese officials announced a target to commission thirty reactors abroad by 2030, with an expected price tag of $145.5 billion. Deals have yet to materialize at the pace needed to meet that target, but Chinese firms are positioning themselves for rapid deployment of largely indigenous generation-III reactor models overseas through the next decade.

The tip of the spear will likely be the Hualong One (HPR-1000) reactor, an indigenous generation-III design developed by a joint venture between CNNC and China General Nuclear Power Corporation (CGN). Three Hualong One reactors are grid-connected in China, with fifteen additional domestic units in the pipeline through 2030. Two units are in operation in Pakistan, and a third unit is planned to start commercial operation at the end of the decade. CNNC also pursued agreements for at least one Hualong One development in Argentina, though progress has stalled since 2022. Hualong exports could also be supplemented with the CAP-1400 model managed by the State Power Investment Corporation. The first two demonstration units of the CAP-1400 reactors, an enlarged adaptation of Westinghouse’s AP-1000 models, began operation in Shandong province at the end of 2024. Ten additional CAP-1000 and -1400 models are planned for commissioning through 2030.

The proposed Chinese domestic nuclear build over the next decade is unmatched in scale and increasingly turning to homegrown reactor technology. While Westinghouse has an understanding of CAP-1000 and -1400 reactor designs given the models’ lineage, Hualong models are distinctly Chinese IP derived from previous ACP- and ACPR-1000 reactors. These units are reportedly cheaper, with CNNC cost estimates ranging from $2.8–$3.5 billion (2,800–3,500 $/kW), and faster to build than peer generation-III reactors. As China’s domestic industry continues to develop workforce expertise and collaborative supply chain platforms for Hualong and CAP reactors, costs and timetables will shrink further.

Domestic efficiency will bolster Chinese capacity to deploy new reactors abroad at scale and on time. The Hualong One model has received “Design Acceptance Confirmation” in the United Kingdom (although a proposed EDF-CGN partnership for a Hualong One reactor in Bradwell was effectively canceled after its announcement in 2022). CNNC was recently selected by Kazakhstan’s atomic energy agency to lead one of two consortiums focused on developing the country’s first nuclear reactor; Rosatom was tapped to lead a secondary collaboration platform. CNNC’s reach now extends to the Gulf following a joint memorandum with the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) focused on short- and long-term fuel supply. South Korea’s KEPCO recently completed construction of the UAE’s first four APR-1400 units, raising questions surrounding the intent of fuel supply provisions in the CNNC deal.

Chinese diplomatic success stems from CNNC and CGN’s state-backed ability to provide favorable financing on par with the Russian model. That appeal has yielded “hard” memorandums of understanding with fourteen countries since 2000, according to 2023 analysis from Third Way.¹ China’s export strategy is well defined, following revisions in 2007 and 2018, and is expanding its footprint of foreign patents, overseas trademarks, and technology licenses for Hualong reactor models. With domestic regulation streamlined and a solid base of foreign engagement, Beijing is primed to mobilize Hualong technology throughout the 2030s, especially considering Asia and Oceania could see close to 200 GW of new nuclear energy capacity through 2040.

With FEOC Like These…

While Western nuclear states may be able to strategically shield domestic market share for incumbent providers, it is difficult to imagine a reality in which Westinghouse, GE Hitachi, KEPCO, or EDF can compete at scale with Chinese and Russian state-backed firms in expanding or emerging nuclear energy markets. Even with recent openings of limited World Bank capital and a renewed focus on catalytic funding from national development finance institutions, Chinese and Russian industry expertise, diplomatic engagement, regulatory structures, and state-backed financing will likely continue to out-compete other offers for generation III reactors over the next decade.

The true geopolitical leverage in nuclear energy comes not from reactor construction, but from fuel supply.

To counter the emerging risks posed by a Sino-Russian nuclear energy environment, U.S. and European firms should get creative to expand existing areas of competitive advantage and innovation. If reactors are not the prime product offering, then policymakers must consider a diplomatic strategy focused on industry disruption. The true geopolitical leverage in nuclear energy comes not from reactor construction, but from fuel supply. Countering FEOC influence thus relies on developing a commercially viable alternative supply of fuel assemblies that can be scaled up with little lead time.

Fuel Diversification in Eastern Europe

A combination of preemptive investment, diplomatic coordination, and political will enabled the diversification play underway in Eastern Europe. The danger posed by continued reliance on Russian assemblies may have prompted reactor operators to seek alternative supply, but the capacity to meet that demand did not emerge overnight. Rather, it is the result of more than three decades of sustained technical and economic development between partners.

Europe’s Investment in Technical Acumen

The decision to develop the IP required to fabricate fuel assemblies for non-Western reactors was made long before the current phase of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Westinghouse began experimenting with the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies fit for hexagonal VVER reactors in the 1990s.² Between 2001 and 2007, a consortium of then UK-owned Westinghouse, Finnish, Hungarian, and Spanish firms delivered VVER assemblies to Finnish reactors before the facility switched back to Russian fuel suppliers (a decision that has since been reversed). Czech authorities also used Westinghouse to supply its Temelin reactor for a period of time before switching back to Russian fuel. An initial fitting of U.S.-made VVER-1000 fuel assemblies was trialed in 2005 for the South Ukraine Unit 3 reactor with a larger order delivered in 2009.

Despite the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine did not fully decouple fuel supply for its Soviet-made reactor fleet from Russian fuel until 2020. Beyond Ukraine, no European countries had moved significantly to decouple from Russian dependency until after the Russian invasion in 2022. However, since the war, a flurry of agreements has been signed. In 2022, Bulgaria, Finland, and the Czech Republic inked agreements for Westinghouse supply of VVER compatible assemblies. Slovakia signed an agreement with Westinghouse in 2023 andFrance’s Framatome in 2024. Hungary lagged behind its Eastern European peers, but signed an agreement with Framatome to supply its singular Paks nuclear facility in 2024. Framatome, however, does not yet have the technical capacity to independently make VVER fuel assemblies. Hence, Framatome may be forced to rely on licensed Russian technology and a joint fuel assembly facility with Rosatom subsidy TVEL to meet its contracts, leading to serious concerns of continued Russian nuclear dependency under a different name.

Framatome’s potential reliance on Russian nuclear supply chains can be constructively contrasted with Westinghouse’s full supply chain independence. Framatome only began developing capacity to independently build VVER fuel assemblies in 2018. Unlike Framatome, Westinghouse and its European partners have been developing the capabilities to produce VVER fuel assemblies at scale for decades, all while fostering relationships with policymakers, reactor operators, and national utilities.

Recognizing the importance of a diverse fuel supply, Euratom commissioned the European Supply of Safe Nuclear Fuel project (ESSANUF) in 2015 with €2 million ($2.2 million) in funding from Europe’s Horizon 2020 fund. The project was intended to kickstart Westinghouse’s VVER-400 assembly design—which was shelved after losing two bids to supply Finland’s Loviisa NPP in 2007—with support from eight European consortium partners. ESSANUF closed in 2017, but its findings improved Westinghouse’s designs and laid the groundwork for renewed continental collaboration on alternative fuels.

ESSANUF’s framework was revisited following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with two supplementary programs: APIS (2023) and SAVE (2024). Both programs direct research funding toward design and fabrication processes improvements for VVER assemblies. The bifurcation of the projects reflects Eastern European offtakers’ desire to have at least two future supply options for required reloads. In total, the projects benefit from over €30 million ($32.4 million) in EU funding, underscoring Europe’s effort to ensure the commercial viability and long-term stability of alternative fuel designs.

Without sustained investment in technical capacity, the ability to transition European reactors off Russian-made fuels to any extent would have been far more problematic (as demonstrated by Framatome). This lesson should be embraced as Chinese firms seek to export their reactor designs and corresponding fuel assembly provision services. If the West does not correspondingly develop the capacity to provide alternative fuel assemblies for Chinese made reactors, it will be granting China significant leverage over countries that choose to embrace Chinese nuclear technology. If VVER reactors are to be a guide, the development of capacities to provide fuel assemblies compatible with the reactors of adversarial powers will be a decades-long process that must start imminently as Chinese firms prepare for broader reactor exports.

What’s the Play?

Just as U.S. and Qatari LNG shipments offset the loss of Russian pipeline gas to Europe, long-standing industrial policy disarmed Moscow’s other “energy weapon.” Three decades of collaboration between Westinghouse and the Euratom community enabled a rapid response to ensure Eastern European nuclear reactors had a reliable source of assemblies.

Now is the time to begin developing the technical capacity to fabricate alternative assemblies for Chinese reactor designs.

As Russian reactor exports solidify Rosatom’s international reach and Chinese models are commercialized abroad, an expanded approach to alternative fuel research, development, and supply is needed. The European model could provide the basis for an international research and development consortia for alternate and advanced fuel supply chains. Similar platforms are already in motion, but as of yet none are expressly focused on countering the threat posed by an increasingly global reliance on Russian and Chinese reactor reloads. Given the decades-long time horizon needed to develop alternatives to Russian VVER models in Europe, now is the time to begin developing the technical capacity to fabricate alternative assemblies for Chinese reactor designs. The model should focus on developing three key functions: 1) developing a new approach to U.S. nuclear diplomacy focused on building technical understanding of FEOC reactor designs; 2) an international strategy for research and development of various fuel assemblies; and 3) continued focus on expanding allied production capacity at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

U.S. policymakers should develop a new approach to civilian nuclear diplomacy focused on early engagement with emerging nuclear energy markets pursuing FEOC reactor technology.

To spur U.S. engagement with potential nuclear partners, the first Donald Trump administration introduced the Nuclear Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (NCMOU) framework in 2019. Twelve NCMOUs have since entered into force, with limited effect. The agreements are intended to “elevate bilateral civil nuclear cooperation and nuclear nonproliferation goals to the most senior governmental levels [and] develop stronger ties between the U.S. and partner country nuclear experts, industry, and researchers.” They are viewed as the first step toward establishing a formal Section 123 agreement, which would open export opportunities for U.S. technology licensing, nuclear material, and reactor equipment. In reality, only one NCMOU has led to the creation of a 123 Agreement; the Philippines’ NCMOU was signed in 2022 and the 123 was codified in 2024, both under the Joe Biden administration.

The second Trump administration has an opportunity to adapt the NCMOU tool to serve as the tip of the spear for countering FEOC fuel influence in emerging nuclear states. NCMOUs should be seen as an opportunity to embed American researchers, advisers, and corporate representatives in markets developing Russian or Chinese reactor technology. Researchers and representatives from the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy, Office of International Affairs, and the network of national laboratories could be integrated into the NCMOU framework. Enmeshed U.S. government officials and scientific experts with an intimate understanding of the nuclear fuel cycle could develop relationships with relevant stakeholders in countries building VVER or Hualong reactors. Ideally, these partnerships could also provide an opportunity to work with reactor operators and national utilities to understand owner needs and technical requirements of specific reactors, should the need arise for alternative fuel supply from U.S. or European providers.

NCMOUs provide an adaptable, existing framework for diplomatic engagement to mitigate future leverage over nuclear fuel supply to new nuclear states, but they must extend to the countries that will be most reliant on Russian and Chinese exports. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has signed four NCMOUs with Bahrain, El Salvador, Malaysia, and Singapore since the start of the second Trump administration. A range of constraints will of course limit involvement with certain countries—Pakistan, for example, is barred under Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines. But wherever possible, the United States and European allies should begin proactive engagement with future importers of FEOC reactor technology as soon as planned projects are announced.

The United States could also support NCMOU partners pursuing contracts with CNNC or Rosatom by offering general legal guidance from relevant U.S. agencies like the Department of Commerce’s Commercial Law and Development Program (CLDP). Rosatom contracts often include provisions to “provide . . . for the entire period of operation . . . on a long-term basis and on negotiable (contractual) basis at agreed prices (taking into account global prices) . . . fabricated fuel assemblies in the quantities required for the initial load and all subsequent reloads.” In more aggressive cases, Rosatom signs build-own-operate contracts, most recently for Türkiye’s Akkuya 1 reactor, which locks in dependence on Russian operation, maintenance, and fuel supply. Once embedded in the NCMOU framework, U.S. advisers from the CLDP could work with partner governments to share best practices and reduce the risk of fuel dependence lock-in through contractual provisions.

Finally, U.S. and European corporate outreach could be organized by the Department of Commerce’s International Trade Administration (ITA), which compiles foreign market assessments for U.S. firms and organizes overseas trade delegations. ITA can also offer expertise from the Civil Nuclear Trade Advisory Committee, which acts as an interlocutor between the secretaries of commerce, state, and energy and the U.S. nuclear energy industry.

NCMOUs are already described as platforms to “facilitate early necessary steps in civil nuclear cooperation that will often precede, and help lay the groundwork for, a 123 Agreement or a Part 810 authorization.” Connections established through targeted NCMOUs could aggregate information and serve as early warning signals for U.S. officials. If foreign malign influence is expected to threaten or disrupt the fuel supply, peer-to-peer familiarity and pre-negotiated terms could fast track Section 123 agreements needed for rapid deployment of fuel reloads.

Lessons learned from Euratom’s ESSANUF, APIS, and SAVE research collaborations should be extrapolated to establish new research platforms with broader participation.

Proactive collaboration between EU grant-making authorities, fuel suppliers, reactor operators, and utility owners enabled the rapid delivery of VVER assemblies compatible with the eighteen active VVER reactors in EU member states. These platforms should be maintained to continue improving VVER-440 and -1000 assembly designs and expanded to develop alternative assemblies for VVER-1200 reactors and CF3-based fuel reloads for Hualong One reactors.

Ideally, new research platforms would extend beyond the borders of the European atomic community to include U.S. and Canadian innovation agencies—notably U.S. national labs and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL)—as well as other reactor/assembly providers like Westinghouse, GE Hitachi, and Cameco. Aggregating resources, research expertise, and existing relationships between North American and European government agencies and private corporations could accelerate the development of alternative assemblies. The platform should emphasize standardization of technical benchmarks, coordinated licensing strategies, and harmonized safety protocols to facilitate cross-border deployment of alternative fuel designs.

The United States and Europe must continue efforts to develop additional capacity at the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle.

Reliance on Russian supply across the fuel cycle is well documented, from yellowcake to low enriched uranium (LEU). Policymakers in Washington and Brussels are taking steps to draw down reliance on Russian uranium concentrate (U3O8), converted uranium hexafluoride, and LEU. In 2024, the EU eroded Russia’s share of U3O8 supply (-36.08 percent), conversion capacity (-15.97 percent), and enrichment services (-37.86 percent) from 2023 levels. The United States recently moved to prohibit Russian imports of uranium products at the end of 2024, though firms are eligible to apply for waivers until 2028. Even with recent policy, Russia’s share of enrichment services for U.S. and European nuclear industries stands around 27 and 24 percent, respectively, underscoring the need for continued vigilance and policy support.

Existing international collaborations for secure fuel supply, too, should be leveraged to address the potential threat of overreliance on Russian or Chinese assemblies. For instance, the Sapporo 5’s impact could be maximized by stretching its purview to include a focus on fabrication, in addition to the current enrichment and conversion focus. The group’s experience and information on the upstream feedstock necessary for fuel fabrication would provide invaluable context and inform potential strategies for strategic stockpiles. Additionally, Japan’s involvement provides a foothold in Asia, which is primed to see the most significant growth in nuclear energy capacity of any region through 2050. Incorporating the Republic of Korea’s nuclear expertise, particularly KEPCO Nuclear Fuels, would round out participation from aligned fuel fabrication suppliers, potentially strengthening the hand of non-Chinese fuel supply in the region.

Conclusion

Developing a strategy to ensure the technical ability to fabricate alternative fuel assemblies for Russian and Chinese reactors will not remove the threat posed by FEOC dominance of new nuclear energy infrastructure or remedy the decades-long atrophying of Western nuclear fuel supply chains. However, the capacity to selectively disrupt Rosatom’s and CNNC’s refill hegemony, thereby negating a significant point of leverage for Moscow and Beijing, is a strategic opportunity that should not be passed up by the United States or allies. The strategy’s utility was demonstrated in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and its potential importance will only grow as new reactors are commissioned around the world.

The capacity to selectively disrupt Rosatom’s and CNNC’s refill hegemony, thereby negating a significant point of leverage for Moscow and Beijing, is a strategic opportunity that should not be passed up by the United States or allies.

The proposed diplomatic approach, beginning with adjusting the intention of the most flexible U.S. nuclear cooperation agreements (NCMOUs) and encouraging international collaboration on research and development with Euratom and within existing agreements like the Sapporo 5, will take time and continued political buy-in from all parties involved. In principle, the proposal fits with the stated objectives of this U.S. administration, transatlantic allies, and other aligned leaders in nuclear energy. Together, a sustained partnership has the potential to undercut one of the many “energy weapons” China is adding to its industrial arsenal.