Ashley J. Tellis
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}Source: Getty
Beradar, Pakistan, and the Afghan Taliban: What Gives?
Recent arrests of high-profile Afghan Taliban leadership by Pakistan do not indicate a strategic change in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy.
Recent arrests of high-profile Afghan Taliban leadership by Pakistan do not indicate a strategic change in Pakistan’s counterterrorism strategy. In reality, Pakistan wants to assume a leading role in negotiating and reconciling with the Afghan Taliban to ensure a friendlier neighbor after the United States withdraws, concludes a paper by Ashley J. Tellis.
Key conclusions:
- Despite arrests of Mullah Beradar and other Taliban leaders (which were either inadvertent or self-serving), Pakistan’s overall strategy of protecting the Afghan Taliban leadership has not changed.
- Pakistan is threatened by the 2011 drawdown of U.S. troops from Afghanistan, which it believes will leave behind an Afghan state with strong ties to its rival India.
- A true change in Pakistan’s strategic calculations requires Islamabad to accept that the Taliban—and not India—is the greatest threat to success in Afghanistan.
- The lack of U.S. leadership at the January London conference on Afghanistan allowed reconciliation with the Taliban to become a centerpiece of the endgame of international involvement.
- Pakistan’s recent arrests of a few Taliban leaders is meant to exert control over the reconciliation process that Pakistan believes is imminent.
“The recent seizures of a few Taliban leaders by Pakistan isn’t much of a turning point in Islamabad’s traditional strategy after all,” writes Tellis.
About the Author
Former Senior Fellow
Ashley J. Tellis was a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Multipolar Dreams, Bipolar Realities: India’s Great Power FuturePaper
- India Sees Opportunity in Trump’s Global Turbulence. That Could Backfire.Commentary
Ashley J. Tellis
Recent Work
Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.
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