• Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
Carnegie Global logoCarnegie lettermark logo
DemocracyIran
  • Donate
{
  "authors": [
    "James M. Acton"
  ],
  "type": "legacyinthemedia",
  "centerAffiliationAll": "dc",
  "centers": [
    "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
    "Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center"
  ],
  "collections": [
    "U.S. Nuclear Policy",
    "Entanglement"
  ],
  "englishNewsletterAll": "ctw",
  "nonEnglishNewsletterAll": "",
  "primaryCenter": "Carnegie Endowment for International Peace",
  "programAffiliation": "NPP",
  "programs": [
    "Nuclear Policy"
  ],
  "projects": [],
  "regions": [
    "North America",
    "United States",
    "East Asia",
    "China",
    "Russia"
  ],
  "topics": [
    "Security",
    "Nuclear Policy",
    "Global Governance",
    "Foreign Policy",
    "Technology"
  ]
}

Source: Getty

In The Media

Escalation Through Entanglement: How the Vulnerability of Command-and-Control Systems Raises the Risks of an Inadvertent Nuclear War

Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict.

Link Copied
By James M. Acton
Published on Aug 8, 2018
Program mobile hero image

Program

Nuclear Policy

The Nuclear Policy Program works to reduce the risk of nuclear catastrophe. Our experts identify and analyze dangers, and then use our global network to advance concrete and pragmatic risk-reduction policies relating to deterrence and international security, arms control, nonproliferation, and nuclear energy.

Learn More

Source: International Security

Abstract

Nonnuclear weapons are increasingly able to threaten dual-use command, control, communication, and intelligence assets that are spaced based or distant from probable theaters of conflict. This form of “entanglement” between nuclear and nonnuclear capabilities creates the potential for Chinese or Russian nonnuclear strikes against the United States or U.S. strikes against either China or Russia to spark inadvertent nuclear escalation. Escalation pressures could be generated through crisis instability or through one of two newly identified mechanisms: “misinterpreted warning” or the “damage-limitation window.” The vulnerability of dual-use U.S. early-warning assets provides a concrete demonstration of the risks. These risks would be serious for two reasons. First, in a conventional conflict against the United States, China or Russia would have strong incentives to launch kinetic strikes on U.S. early-warning assets. Second, even limited strikes could undermine the United States' ability to monitor nuclear attacks by the adversary. Moreover, cyber interference with dual-use early-warning assets would create the additional danger of the target's misinterpreting cyber espionage as a destructive attack. Today, the only feasible starting point for efforts to reduce the escalation risks created by entanglement would be unilateral measures—in particular, organizational reform to ensure that those risks received adequate consideration in war planning, acquisition decisions, and crisis decisionmaking. Over the longer term, unilateral measures might pave the way for more challenging cooperative measures, such as agreed restrictions on threatening behavior.

Preface

Since first publishing this article, it has become clear to me that one of my arguments risks being misunderstood as implying that the United States has the capability to successfully undermine China’s or Russia’s nuclear deterrents. I argue that if the United States became concerned that its nuclear command, control, communication, and intelligence system was about to be attacked, it “could worry that its window of opportunity for conducting effective damage-limitation operations might have closed by the time the war turned nuclear.” I further argue that this concern—which I term the “damage-limitation window”—could spark escalation.

My point here is not that the United States has the capability to conduct effective damage-limitation operations. In fact, I have long argued that, today and for the foreseeable future, the United States could not deprive either China or Russia of its second-strike capability. Nonetheless, the United States openly acknowledges that it plans for damage-limitation operations. Even though these operations would almost certainly prove ineffective, in a large-scale conflict, decisionmakers might be reluctant to abandon the option of conducting them (not least because political leaders might not fully understand the full extent of their probable ineffectiveness). For this reason, the damage-limitation window could prove escalatory even as China and Russia retain survivable second-strike capabilities.

This preface was added based on feedback received after publication.

Read Full Text

This article was originally published in International Security.

About the Author

James M. Acton

Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program

Acton holds the Jessica T. Mathews Chair and is co-director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

    Recent Work

  • Commentary
    What the New Democratic Congress Can (and Can’t) Do on Foreign Policy
      • +10

      James M. Acton, Dan Baer, Mark Baldassare, …

  • Paper
    Nuclear Weapons and the Future of American Power

      James M. Acton, Ankit Panda

James M. Acton
Jessica T. Mathews Chair, Co-director, Nuclear Policy Program
James M. Acton
SecurityNuclear PolicyGlobal GovernanceForeign PolicyTechnologyNorth AmericaUnited StatesEast AsiaChinaRussia

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

More Work from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

  • People walking past a COP31 sign
    Commentary
    Emissary
    Six Unanswered Questions as COP31 Enters Its Final Stretch

    Conference delegates must decide whether their legacy will be stalled progress or a major step forward.

      • Shana Tabak headshot

      Shana Tabak

  • Robotic arms at an EV manufacturing plant working on a battery assembly
    Commentary
    Emissary
    To Keep Its Second Place in the Global Battery Race, Seoul Needs More Teammates

    In an increasingly competitive landscape, Seoul should expand its current partnership with Washington and deepen ties with Brussels and New Delhi.

      • Milo McBride

      Darcie Draudt-Véjares, Milo McBride

  • Commentary
    Carnegie Politika
    Russia Has Not Lost the Balkans, Despite Vučić’s Defeat in Serbia

    It’s a testing time for Russia’s policy in Serbia and the wider region, but it would be premature to conclude from one political setback that the days of Russian influence are over. 

      Dimitar Bechev

  • Commentary
    Strategic Europe
    Starlink Should Make Europe Act Strategically

    Too many national interests, too many EU institutions, and too little political will are preventing Europe from acting in its own best interests.

      Judy Dempsey

  • People standing in a line at dusk
    Commentary
    California’s Direct Democracy and State Policymaking in the Midterms

    Voters sent mixed messages about funding priorities.

      • Ian Klaus

      Mark Baldassare, Ian Klaus

Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie This Week
Carnegie global logo, stacked
1779 Massachusetts Avenue NWWashington, DC, 20036-2103Phone: 202 483 7600
  • Research
  • Emissary
  • About
  • Experts
  • Donate
  • Programs
  • Events
  • Blogs
  • Podcasts
  • Contact
  • Annual Reports
  • Careers
  • Privacy
  • For Media
  • Government Resources
Get more news and analysis from
Carnegie This Week
© 2026 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved.