Introduction
The central geopolitical problem in the Middle East today—the tragedy of regional power politics, to borrow from political scientist John Mearsheimer—lies in the inability of its states to build a stable regional order. This comes as the influence and interventionist impulses of the region’s former hegemonic power, the United States, are receding, creating a vacuum in which strong, assertive countries have engaged in sustained competition and tested the limits of their capacities, while resisting domination by rivals. However, none is strong enough to dominate and reshape the region decisively.
Now that the Gaza war appears to have ended, Israel increasingly sees itself as a regional hegemon. Yet hegemony requires not only power but also acceptance and legitimacy, which Israel is far from securing. Following Israel’s attack against Qatar last September, Gulf leaders also came to view Israel as a threat to their security interests. At the same time, tensions between Israel and Türkiye are deepening, particularly in Syria, while Israeli attacks in Lebanon show the country remains an arena of confrontation between Israel and Iran.
Is such a situation unprecedented? Between the 1960s and 1980s, the Arab state system was characterized by ideological conflict, assertive leadership, proxy wars, and clashing ambitions, yet the regional order operated with surprising coherence. What unified Arab regimes was not a shared vision but a shared imperative: preserving existing authoritarian systems and preventing challenges to the balance of power and regional stability by states seeking regional hegemony or promoting powerful ideological agendas. Fear of internal collapse was the glue of the Arab order. This system contained Egypt’s attempt to gain a foothold in the Arabian Peninsula through its Yemen campaign after 1962, ended the conflict between Jordan and Palestinian factions in 1970, temporarily halted Lebanon’s civil war in 1975–1976, and inhibited Iran’s ambitions to export its Islamist ideology after the revolution.
Yet after more than a decade of upheaval, starting with the Arab uprisings in 2010–2011, no mechanism has been found to organize regional stability, along the lines of the 1815 Congress of Vienna that ended the Napoleonic wars, and more broadly the revolutionary phase that followed the French Revolution. Until regional states acknowledge their limitations and negotiate a regional arrangement they can all tolerate, the Middle East will remain trapped in recurring tensions, shifting alliances, and systemic conflict. Defining the contours of such an equilibrium will be essential for the region’s future.
The End of Pax Americana
The end of Pax Americana in the Middle East, the U.S.-led regional order that emerged after the Cold War’s end in 1989, has been a driver of instability, creating a void that countries in the region are now seeking to fill. The era of American hegemony offers lessons for understanding the prospects for stability in the coming decades.
First, Pax Americana itself was not necessarily stabilizing. Regional dominance usually provokes resistance to a hegemonic power, and throughout the past four decades the United States has been contested by multiple countries. Iran challenged the U.S.-anchored order starting in 1979 and continued doing so after 1989. Syria under the Assads both engaged with Washington and opposed it after the invasion of Iraq in 2003, which many countries regarded as a threat to the status quo. The Middle East is characterized by sectarian, ethnic, and ideological divisions, weak state institutions, and persistent rivalries. This makes it resistant to imposed order, particularly from a distant power such as the United States.
Second, the U.S. repeatedly failed as a credible powerbroker in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Successive administrations have been either unwilling or unable to resolve this paramount regional concern, which continues to undermine stability and alienate Arab public opinion. Washington has also struggled to balance the competing ambitions of major regional powers—Iran, Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Israel. The result has been an antagonistic political environment in which U.S. leadership has lost coherence and authority.
Third, U.S. inconsistency has eroded trust among Washington’s allies and emboldened adversaries. From Barack Obama’s failure to carry through on his “red line” against chemical weapons use during the Syrian uprising to his pivot away from the Middle East toward Asia, to Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear accord with Iran, to Joe Biden’s efforts to recalibrate U.S. regional policy without offering long-term security guarantees to his Gulf allies, Washington has repeatedly embodied strategic drift. Unconditional support for Israel, even before the Gaza war, has demonstrated that Washington not only seeks to guarantee Israel’s military superiority but also its political impunity, which has had political costs.
Finally, the end of unipolarity, accelerated by China’s rise, Russia’s renewed boldness, and the emergence of a multipolar global order, has weakened Washington’s ability to unilaterally shape outcomes. This has given regional powers opportunities to diversify their military and economic partnerships and extract better terms from the United States. If Pax Americana failed to guarantee stability, its end has only produced a struggle for regional influence.
The Abraham Accords of 2020 were a U.S. attempt to consolidate regional order around states aligned with Washington. By normalizing ties between Israel and certain Arab countries, the accords aimed to combine Israel’s technological and military advantages with Arab financial and diplomatic clout, creating a bloc capable of countering Iran. Yet the limits were quickly apparent. Israeli brutality in Gaza provoked outrage in the Arab world, undermining the legitimacy of normalization with Israel. Saudi Arabia, in particular, lost interest after China brokered a rapprochement with Iran and Washington refused to provide security guarantees to the kingdom, even if the Trump administration designated it a “major non-NATO U.S. ally” in November 2025. While the Abraham Accords remain in place, they haven’t evolved into a U.S.-led cornerstone of regional order.
U.S. hegemony may have ended, but genuine multipolarity remains a distant prospect. The Assad regime’s downfall in 2024 removed a major Russian ally in the Middle East, reducing Moscow’s regional footprint, while China’s economic rise and strategic partnerships have not meaningfully challenged the U.S. role. Beijing was largely absent from the Gaza conflict, limiting itself to rhetorical condemnation, and took no action even during Ansar Allah’s blockade of Red Sea shipping. For now, China appears content to benefit from the dividend of U.S. military preponderance, despite its dependency on maritime trade routes and Middle Eastern energy. The landscape is not yet one of a stable multipolar system.
What Will Define a Future Regional Order?
The Middle East stands at a critical juncture. In the absence of a regional hegemon, such as the United States, how can the region move beyond its instability and build a regional order that reduces tensions? Stability is possible if regional powers acknowledge their structural limitations and recognize their mutual constraints.
Since the beginning of the century, several developments have heightened regional volatility. The expansion of Iran’s influence after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, like the emergence of a so-called “Shia crescent” stretching from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as threatening. At the same time, Türkiye and Qatar viewed the Arab uprisings beginning in 2010–2011 as an opportunity to extend their influence through Muslim Brotherhood movements. This triggered a backlash in many countries, mainly driven by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, whose actions could be inconsistent: they backed counterrevolutionary forces in Egypt and Tunisia, but not in Syria, as interests determined their choices. Israel, in turn, has seen its campaigns in Gaza and the West Bank, and against Iran and its allies in 2024–2025, as major strides in expanding its power.
The collapse of the Assad regime, the unravelling of the Iran-sponsored Axis of Resistance, the recalibration of Gulf-Iran relations, regional powers’ efforts to establish zones of influence, and the transactional U.S. approach might well reorder the Middle East. Three factors will determine if a cohesive regional system emerges, namely whether a more conservative, even reactionary, political environment, defined by a balance of power and counterrevolutionary instincts, can take shape, as this is what states will gravitate toward and defend after securing their aims. A second defining factor will be Iran’s trajectory, given its role as a revisionist regional power. A third will be whether regional powers can coexist in their respective spheres of influence.
Toward a New Counterrevolutionary Order
In the decade after the Arab uprisings, several Arab regimes, supported by key Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE, worked relentlessly to close that chapter. Not all conflicts since then have been caused by counterrevolutionary dynamics, or provoked by Gulf states alone. However, they have all been instigated by the widespread nature of regional instability that has recast power relations, with countries pursuing their contending interests and seeking to anchor their gains in a more stable order.
This has not altered the fact that authoritarian regimes viewed the uprisings as a threat and sought to eliminate all revolutionary potential. That to which they aspired was similar to the post-1815 European order, in which monarchies agreed to restore a balance of power and neutralize forces unleashed by the French Revolution. Even Syria’s new leaders framed the Assad regime’s downfall as a transition aligning with the geopolitical consensus, not as part of a revolutionary wave. Ahmad al-Sharaa signaled his moderation, reassuring Gulf capitals and emphasizing that Syria would maintain the 1974 Disengagement Agreement with Israel and prevent foreign actors from using Syrian territory against anyone in the region.
A core condition of a new conservative order is the eradication of ideological movements regarded as destabilizing. Several Arab regimes are pushing for a post-ideological phase centered on nationalism, technocratic modernity, and state-driven development. Their animus toward the Muslim Brotherhood has shaped domestic and regional politics alike, and these regimes seek to marginalize political Islam and defang transnational ideologies of all stripes. In parallel, some analysts see Iran’s regional setbacks as paving the way for a more conventional, nationalist state, ushering in the end of transnational Shiism.
However, a conservative, even counterrevolutionary, regional order requires more than eliminating ideological foes. Its viability depends on the ability of countries to deliver economically and a settlement of the Palestinian question. Authoritarian restoration can only endure if states meet the minimal expectations of their populations for economic security. This is not guaranteed. Several countries—Egypt, Tunisia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan—face acute fiscal stress, institutional decay, and environmental degradation. Governance failures and corruption make it difficult for elites to sustain legitimacy and contain social discontent.
The Palestinian issue remains an enduring obstacle as well. Public opinion across the Arab world remains deeply attached to the Palestinians’ plight, and Gaza’s devastation has intensified grievances. The fate of the Palestinians continues to erode the legitimacy of regimes seen as disregarding Palestinian rights, particularly from countries that joined the Abraham Accords. The region cannot stabilize around a conservative order that ignores Palestinian aspirations for statehood. Jordan and Egypt would perceive Israeli plans for the West Bank’s annexation or the displacement of Gaza’s Palestinians as deeply destabilizing, reinforcing the conviction among Arab regimes and publics that Israel is a settler-colonial project driven by territorial expansion. Saudi Arabia, the only Arab state with the capacity to forge a regional consensus, has tied normalization with Israel to credible progress on a Palestinian state. Although the two-state solution appears increasingly illusory, launching a viable peace process remains essential to consolidating a conservative regional order.
Iran’s Trajectory as a Determinant of the Region’s Direction
A second, and decisive, factor shaping the likelihood of a sustainable Middle Eastern equilibrium is Iran’s future. What will ensue after the passing of supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei remains uncertain, but it is likely the Islamic Republic’s revolutionary ideology will be contested, if not fully revised, given its failures and growing public discontent.
For decades, much of the West, Israel, and many Arab states have viewed Iran as a primary source of regional instability. Since the end of the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), Tehran has relied on a “forward defense” strategy to insulate its territory from conflict. Shaped by the trauma of the war and U.S. military interventions in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003), this doctrine rested on three pillars: a network of allied armed groups, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq, and Ansar Allah in Yemen; a ballistic missile and drone program providing strategic capabilities; and a naval posture based on asymmetrical tactics to deter U.S. forces and be effective in key Persian Gulf waterways.
The two main objectives in this approach were deterring Israel and the United States from attacking Iran directly; and securing influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen, turning them into buffers or platforms for Iranian action. However, the Gaza war’s ramifications showed that Iran’s Axis of Resistance project had its limits. Hezbollah’s effective surrender in November 2024, Gaza’s devastation, and a twelve-day war in June 2025 that saw Israel and the United States bomb Iran, including its nuclear facilities and missile capabilities, exposed the shortcomings of its transnational proxy network. Instead, it consolidated a counter-axis including the Gulf states and Israel, leaving Iran isolated and strategically constrained.
A post-Khamenei nationalistic Iran may well remain authoritarian and become inward-looking. This would have profound implications: Iran’s proxies would need to review their role and reposition themselves internally, potentially evolving into more nationalistic, less militarized actors. Their future will be shaped mainly by the direction Iran chooses.
Yet Iran’s greatest vulnerability lies at home. The regime faces domestic fragility, declining legitimacy, and a deteriorating economy. External confrontation may briefly generate nationalistic solidarity, but it cannot resolve the country’s structural crisis. A young, disillusioned population increasingly rejects the ideology of wilayat al-faqih, which combines supreme judicial, religious, and political power in a single Islamic jurist, and views Iranian regional adventurism as costly and leading to international isolation.
The prospects for a stable regional order depend heavily on Iran’s strategic direction. The more Tehran moves toward national prioritization, economic reconstruction, and deescalation, and away from regional adventurism, the greater the chances of reshaping the Middle East around a sustainable equilibrium. Conversely, if Iran doubles down on confrontation and ideological resistance, regional instability will deepen.
Redrawing Regional Spheres of Influence
U.S. disengagement, a decade and a half of transformative conflicts, and the rise of new regional powers have unleashed unprecedented competition among Middle Eastern states to expand their spheres of influence. Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, in turn, have become contested arenas in which Israel, Türkiye, Iran, and Saudi Arabia are seeking to advance their interests, usually at each other’s expense. A decisive factor shaping the region’s future will be whether these spheres of influence can be reconciled or will remain zones of rivalry.
While Israel sees itself as the region’s hegemonic power, in practice it has become a major driver of instability. Guided by the “Iron Wall” doctrine of imposing outcomes through overwhelming military force, Israel’s “peace through strength” approach disregards the political and historical roots of conflict, the humanitarian toll of military campaigns, and the interests of other regional powers that must be factored into sustainable regional settlements. The limitations are evident. First, Israel’s violent actions in Gaza and the West Bank, like its aggressiveness in general, have triggered defensive counterreactions from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye, Jordan, and even Pakistan, amid a growing perception that Israel threatens Arab interests. In light of this, even before Israeli strikes weakened Iran’s regional military network in 2024, Gulf states had already begun reengaging with Tehran.
Second, Israel’s ambitions are undermining the sovereignty of neighboring states, particularly Lebanon and Syria. Israel occupies both countries’ territory and frequently bombs them, while preventing the rebuilding of state capacities and even of areas destroyed by war. This has clashed with Turkish and Saudi priorities. Türkiye seeks to restore state authority in Syria to contain Iranian networks, while preventing the emergence of a Kurdish autonomous zone. For Israel, a strong Syrian state, especially aligned with Ankara, potentially challenges Israel’s ability to shape events to its north. Southern Syria is a microcosm of these tensions. Segments of the Druze community’s leadership increasingly want to escape Damascus’ grip, while Kurdish groups in the northeast are also reluctant to accept the new leadership, furthering Israel’s preference for empowering Syria’s minorities.
Lebanon faces similar risks: the Shia community is caught between outside pressures to disarm Hezbollah, Iran’s desire to retain leverage, and its own need for a state that can provide protection and services. Saudi Arabia and other countries aim to curtail Iran’s influence in Syria and Lebanon, but will not accept Israel’s destruction of southern Lebanon or actions in Syria that create circumstances for Iran to reconstitute its Axis of Resistance.
Israel’s strategy relies on a dangerous assumption that regional fragmentation and state collapse can secure long-term Israeli domination of its political environment. Forcing Hezbollah’s disarmament, for instance, risks pushing Lebanon into civil war. Normalizing relations with Syria while occupying the country and widening sectarian fractures could further weaken the state and delegitimize its leaders. No Arab government will accept a regional order built on state collapse, particularly if accompanied by the mass displacement of Palestinians from Gaza and the West Bank, which would destabilize Egypt and Jordan. Yet such plans enjoy explicit support within Israel’s political class.
Ultimately, the Middle East’s future will be determined by whether regional powers reach an understanding over their spheres of influence and commit to building functional states. Without a negotiated framework delineating roles, limits, and responsibilities, the region will remain trapped in a cycle of confrontation and fragmentation.
Conclusion
The Middle East may be evolving toward a balance-of-power system, reminiscent of post-1815 Europe. However, that era lacked a single dominant state, and stability emerged from a mutual recognition of limits. The Middle East has never had a Congress of Vienna, but the structural conditions for one are taking shape. The next phase will require constructing a more sustainable regional order, based on negotiation and grudging acceptance of a balance of interests, agreed among regional capitals and anchored by global powers.
About the Authors
Hamza Meddeb is a research fellow at the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center in Beirut, where he co-leads the Political Economy Program.
Mohamed Ali Adraoui is a research professor at Georgetown University and the author of Salafism Goes Global: From the Gulf to the French Banlieues (Oxford University Press, 2020).
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